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Abstract: Earmarked aid to international development organizations has quadrupled over the 
last two decades and now represents almost twenty percent of total aid. This paper introduces 
a new dataset on earmarked aid, which alternatively has been referred to as multi-bi, 
restricted, non-core or trust fund aid. The data makes it possible to track the rise of the new aid 
channel over an extended period of time and in greater detail regarding, e.g., the implementing 
multilateral organizations. The data include more than 100,000 earmarked projects of 23 OECD 
donors to 290 multilateral institutions from 1990 to 2012. We graphically illustrate the 
distribution and patterns of this new aid channel for all actors involved, namely donor 
governments and their aid-providing agencies, multilateral organizations, and recipient 
countries, and highlight promising avenues for further research. In a first empirical application 
of the data, we analyze donors’ heterogeneous use of earmarked aid, and test three lines of 
argument for the provision of earmarked aid: official donor motives regarding specific recipient 
needs, public opinion in donor countries, and ‘market-oriented’ donor economies’ use of 
earmarked aid to ‘bypass’ recipient countries with weak governance. We show that earmarked 
aid is associated with different donor- and recipient-level factors than traditional or ‘pure’ 
bilateral aid. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, donor governments have increased the share of the foreign aid they 
provide as earmarked funding to multilateral organizations (Figure 1). Earmarked aid, which has 
alternatively been referred to as multi-bi aid, non-core or restricted funding, is implemented by 
a multilateral development organization in the sector, country, or region stipulated by the 
donor.1 Academic research on earmarked aid and trust funds, the institutional vehicle in which 
earmarked aid is managed, has taken off only recently. This is partly due to the lack of extended 
time-series data on this new type of aid. The implications of earmarked funding for aid 
effectiveness, donor coordination, accountability, and recipient country ownership remain 
largely unassessed. The new multi-bi aid data introduced in this paper will advance this 
emerging strand of the aid literature by offering a longer time-series of data, more precise 
information about the international development organizations receiving the funds, and 
additional information about the earmarking type and depth of individual aid activities. We 
graphically illustrate the temporal, geographical, and sectoral use of this new aid channel and 
provide a first empirical application that analyzes donor governments’ differential use of 
earmarked aid. Beyond the question addressed in this paper, the data allows researchers to 
tackle questions such as the rise of earmarked aid, the multilateral organizations involved, and 
to develop theories about allocation patterns of this type of aid across sectors and recipient 
countries.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the data. 
Section 3 explores the data from the perspective of each actor affected by earmarked funding, 
namely donor countries and their aid-providing agencies, multilateral organizations, and 
recipient countries. We provide first evidence on common ‘wisdoms’ held in the emerging 
literature on earmarked aid, and suggest research questions to be analyzed using the new data. 
One major finding from this section is that post-conflict and fragile states are major 
beneficiaries of the increases in earmarked funding. We also show that there is a continuous 
increase in the number of multilateral organizations receiving earmarked funds, but find no 
evidence that donors use earmarked funding to venture into new sectors or new partner 
countries. In section 4, we briefly review the literature and apply the multi-bi aid data to 
analyze three explanations about donor countries’ heterogeneous use of these funds: official 
donor motives, the role of public opinion, and the ‘bypass’-hypothesis advanced in the recent 
literature. We contribute to the aid budget and the aid allocation literature by showing results 
from regressions with, alternatively, donor countries and donor-recipient relationships as units 
                                                          
1 Multi-bi or earmarked aid refers to “voluntary external assistance from donors for a multilateral agency 
which is supplementary to core membership contributions and which is earmarked for specific 
purposes” (OECD 2005: 102). 
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of analysis. We find that both recipient- and donor-level variables are statistically associated 
with the volume of earmarked aid provided and that the size of earmarked aid budgets 
correlates with a different set of factors than ‘pure’ bilateral aid budgets. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Introducing the multi-bi aid data 
This paper introduces the three components of an original dataset on multi-bi aid, which is 
publicly available on http://aiddata.org/donor-datasets. The data allow researchers to track 
earmarked aid across donors, multilateral organizations, and sectors over the 1990-2012 
period. The data is based on the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD‘s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) and improved through expert coding.2 The new multi-bi aid 
dataset corrects and refines information about the multilateral aid recipient. Component 1 of 
the data includes the 290 multilateral institutions with permanent organizational structure 
mentioned in donors’ project descriptions (Appendix D). Component 2 of the data is at the 
project-level. It extends information about earmarked aid and the multilateral recipient from 
2005, the year since the channelcode has been consistently reported, backwards to 1990. It also 
includes new information about the earmarking stringency of individual aid activities for the full 
time period. The dataset takes the perspective of the multilateral institution in defining 
earmarked aid flows, which is in contrast to the OECD data that relies on the donors' 
perspective. Our dataset is more adequate for time-series analysis because the OECD/DAC has 
re-categorized some recipient institutions of earmarked aid (i.e. accounted as bilateral aid by 
the OECD/DAC) to being eligible for multilateral core funding.3 For these reasons and, mainly, 
because of inconsistencies between activity descriptions and the channelcodes reported by 
donors in the CRS dataset, we obtain aggregate amounts for multi-bi and bilateral aid that 
differ slightly from OECD data (component 3). A comparison with the CRS shows that our data 
more smoothly captures the total flows of earmarked aid over a longer time period (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The codebook (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2014) is available on the authors’ websites and on 
http://aiddata.org/donor-datasets. 
3 The adequate perspective depends on the research question. We think that the perspective of the 
international organization is better suited for political economy analyses, which see multi-bi aid as a 
donor policy allowing increased influence over ‘multilateral’ allocations.  
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Figure 1: The evolution of earmarked aid 
 
Notes: Earmarked (=multi-bi =restricted =non-core) aid refers to any earmarked funds received by 
international development organizations. Multilateral aid consists of assessed contributions and un-
earmarked voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations. Traditional (= ‘pure’) bilateral aid is 
provided directly to recipient country governments or through intermediaries such as NGOs. 
Figure 2: Aggregate earmarked aid: comparison of the new multi-bi aid and the OECD data 
 
Notes: Comparison of aggregate multi-bi aid disbursements according to the new multi-bi aid data and 
the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (1990-2012). The pattern for multi-bi aid commitments is similar. 
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3. Actors in earmarked aid: donor countries, multilateral organizations, and recipient 
countries 
The multi-bi aid data make it possible to track earmarking over time and to study the role of 
each actor involved in the process: First, we look at the financiers of earmarked aid, donor 
countries and their aid-providing agencies. We then shed light on the international 
development organizations to which donors delegate the aid for implementation and 
disbursement to the targeted beneficiaries. Lastly, we focus on the ultimate beneficiaries of 
earmarked aid, global public goods and recipient countries.  
3.1 Donor countries and their national aid agencies 
Figures 1 and 3 display the upward trend in earmarked funding in absolute and relative terms, 
respectively. Following a rapid growth since the 2000s, earmarked aid flows reached about USD 
20 billion in 2012. Earmarking seems like the ‘best of both worlds’ for a donor government, 
combining the benefits of multilateral delegation with, as in the case of ‘pure’ or traditional 
bilateral aid, the control over the allocation of resources to specific projects. Puzzlingly, donors’ 
use of earmarked aid is all but homogeneous. Figure 3 depicts the average use of earmarked aid 
by the 23 DAC donors in our sample for the years 2006-2012, when earmarked aid has been 
most substantial. The contrast between donors is stark: while Korea spent only three percent of 
its aid budget as multi-bi aid, Canada provided almost a quarter of its total aid envelope as 
earmarked aid.  
Figure 4 explores donor heterogeneity in the use of earmarked funding over time. For 
representation purposes, we compare the average share of earmarked aid in the total aid 
budget within each of four time periods (1990-1995, 1996-2001, 2002-2007, 2008-2012), three 
of which consist of six years and one of five years. For tractability, only the largest aid donor 
countries and the largest donors of earmarked aid are represented individually, while we group 
the remaining donor countries together. Donors are put into groups based on their geographic 
proximity and/or based on similarity in the evolution of their shares of earmarked aid when we 
analyzed them individually. For example, we group the large aid donors Japan, Germany and 
France because they have all used earmarking to a small extent. Figure 4 shows that earmarked 
aid has increased as share of total aid budgets in all donor countries and groups, which is in line 
with the aggregate trend in Figure 1. In Germany and the Netherlands, there is a reduction in 
the share of earmarked aid from the second-to-last (2002-2007) to the last period (2008-2012), 
while in most donor countries/groupings, the share of earmarked funding doubled between 
these two periods. Within each of these time periods, there is substantial variation in the 
average share of earmarked aid provided across donors. During the 1996-2001 period, the 
Dutch government already provides earmarked aid equivalent to 18 percent of its ‘pure’ 
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bilateral aid budget, while the average Nordic country provides 12 percent,4 and France, 
Germany, and Japan earmark hardly any aid at all. 
Figure 3: DAC donors’ average use of different aid channels (2006-2012) 
 
Notes: Average share of earmarked, multilateral and bilateral in total Official Development Assistance 
(2006-2012). The country abbreviations refer, from left to right, to South Korea, Japan, France, 
Germany, Austria, New Zealand, the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, 
Norway, and Canada. 
                                                          
4 In the 1996-2001 period, Denmark is an outlier in the Nordic group, providing only around 1.5 percent 
of its ‘pure’ bilateral aid as earmarked aid. 
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Figure 4: Share of earmarked aid over time for major donors and donor groups 
 
Notes: Earmarked aid as share of ‘pure’ bilateral aid for four time periods. We use the following donor 
groups: major donors with small shares of multi-bi aid (France, Germany, Japan), Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland), European DAC members (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland), and non-European DAC members (Australia, Canada, Korea, 
New Zealand). USA, GBR and NED refer to the United States of America, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands respectively.  
Figure 5 explores in more detail which donor countries lead the earmarking trend. The 
graph compares the relative importance of each donor country in total earmarked aid for two 
time periods of almost equal length (1990-2001 and 2002-2012). The donor countries to the left 
of the dotted 45-degree line increase in (relative) importance over time while those to the right 
decline in relative terms. The slope of the solid line representing the line of best fit is less steep 
than the slope of the 45-degree line and has a positive intercept, which implies that earmarked 
aid has become an established aid instrument for a majority of donor countries over the past 
decade. Bubble sizes are determined by donors’ total aid budget in the second time period 
(2002-2012) and represent their importance as aid providers in absolute terms. The 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are the leading donors in the 1990-2001 period, providing, 
respectively, 25, 15, and 14 percent, and thus together more than half of all earmarked funding 
in the period. The United Kingdom and Australia provided around 5 percent each in the first 
time period. Detailed analyses show that these five donors, Canada, and Denmark started 
providing earmarked aid in the early 1990s. Although the three ‘pioneer’ donors remain among 
the ten most important providers in the second time period, the United Kingdom and the U.S. 
are the most important donors in the second time period, providing 10 and 9 percent of 
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earmarked funding respectively. The graph also shows that the earmarking of aid has become 
much more common in the second period and, consequently, is no longer dominated by a small 
number of donors. It is noteworthy that none of the largest aid donors is an early adopter of 
earmarked aid and that some large donors remain marginal (Germany and France), while 
others have become important actors (the United States and the United Kingdom). 
Figure 5: Leaders and followers in earmarked aid 
 
Notes: For each donor, the graph shows the relative importance of the donor country in providing 
earmarked funding over the respective period (share of a donor’s earmarked funding in a period over 
total earmarked funding by all donors in the period). The dotted line indicates equal importance of a 
donor in both time periods (45-degree line). Donors with bubbles to the left of the dotted line have 
become relatively more important in more recent years (2002-2012) while those to the right of the 
dotted line have declined in importance. The solid line is the line of best fit. The size of the bubbles is 
determined by donors’ total aid from 2002 to 2012.  
The differential use of earmarked funding revealed by figures 3-5 calls for theoretical 
explanations about the international and domestic (political economy) reasons that led some 
donors to pioneer earmarked funding in the 1990s and that made earmarked aid popular in 
some but not other donor countries in the 2000s. While one might think that earmarked 
funding is a reaction to institutional change at multilateral organizations, the rise of earmarked 
funding is not explained by changes in funding rules alone. In an insightful analysis of changing 
funding rules at the United Nations, Graham (2015) shows that earmarked or, in her 
terminology, restricted funding was permitted at more than ten UN institutions already in the 
1970s (see Figure 1 in Graham 2015). Reinsberg et al. (2015a) propose two narratives for the 
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rise of multi-bi aid: one is related to the increased focus on fighting poverty and the Millennium 
Development Goals while the other argues that policy makers sought to increase aid 
effectiveness as a reaction to rising domestic skepticism about foreign aid activities. A more 
trivial explanation for the rise of multi-bi aid is that earmarked funding has risen with improved 
IT infrastructure, which allowed quick and detailed (financial) reporting for each and every 
donor contribution. As all of these trends coincide, it is a major challenge for researchers to 
develop a research design that make it possible to convincingly discriminate between these 
reasons. Moreover, none of these arguments helps to explain the heterogeneous use of multi-
bi aid by donor governments.  
Eichenauer and Hug (2015) propose a game-theoretical model to explain heterogeneity 
across donors, which includes aspects related to international and domestic political economy. 
They show that the interaction between governance rules at international organizations, 
heterogeneity in donor preferences, concerns about aid effectiveness, and domestic constraints 
interact in determining donors’ choice of aid channel. In academic debates, the argument is 
often raised that smaller donor states with less (formal and informal) influence in a multilateral 
organization should be the most likely to use earmarked funding to make the organization work 
in their preferred issue areas. A World Bank evaluation notes that the majority of donor 
countries use earmarked funds to influence the World Bank (IEG 2011). But although the data 
show that some smaller states with generous aid budgets have spearheaded the rise of 
earmarked funding and that some large donors have used earmarked funding to a small extent 
even in recent years, this pattern cannot be applied as a general rule for all, small and large 
states. We review other theories for donors’ choice of earmarked aid and other aid channels 
and test some of them in section 4 using regression analysis. 
We now turn to examining the aid-providing institutions within a government 
administration and first analyze whether national ministries, departments and other agencies 
use multi-bi aid to make a foray into bilateral aid provision. There is no such evidence. All 
government agencies reporting multi-bi aid to the OECD also provide bilateral aid. Next, we 
investigate the OECD’s (2011: 18) claim that “there are many examples of dispersed decision-
making” regarding multilateral core (un-earmarked) contributions and earmarked aid to the 
same multilateral organization. Unfortunately, we cannot study this claim directly as we lack 
information about the donor agency responsible for un-earmarked funding to each of the 290 
multilateral development organizations we identified. Instead, we analyze the national agencies 
that provide bilateral aid on which information is available in the CRS. We find that in almost all 
donor countries, the one or two government agencies that jointly disburse 55 to 100 percent of 
bilateral aid also jointly report more than 80 percent of a donor governments’ earmarked aid.  
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Figure 6: Concentration of earmarked and bilateral aid provision in donor countries  
 
Notes: The left axis corresponds to the Herfindahl index, which measures the concentration of actors in 
a market. Higher values indicate a higher concentration. The right axis corresponds to the circle and 
triangle symbols and indicates the number of agencies in a donor country providing bilateral aid in the 
1990-2001 and 2002-2012 periods, respectively. 
Figure 6 illustrates the concentration ratio of national agencies providing bilateral and 
earmarked aid using the Herfindahl index.5 We find bilateral aid to be more dispersed than 
multi-bi aid, which implies that responsibility for earmarked aid is more concentrated than 
bilateral aid. The circles and triangles, which correspond to the first and second decade of 
earmarked aid (1990-2001 and 2002-2012, respectively), show the number of ministries, 
departments, and other agencies within donor governments, that are engaged in the provision 
of earmarked aid. The number of agencies does not decrease in any donor country and 
increases in most of them, although the number of aid actors within a government varies 
greatly across donor countries. In sum, the national lead aid agency/agencies are the first to use 
earmarked aid and are responsible for providing most of its volume. As this is merely 
descriptive evidence, researchers may develop more complex theories about the bureaucratic 
interactions within a donor government that drive these results. For example, national agencies 
may differ in the stringency of their earmarking. Reinsberg et al. (2015a) provide first insights 
about patterns in the depth of earmarking. 
                                                          
5 We calculated the Herfindahl index as the sum of squared shares of a donor's agencies in the donor's 
total aid budget. Values thus range from 1/N to 1, where N refers to the number of aid-providing 
agencies. 
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3.2 Multilateral organizations 
Next, we study multilateral development organizations. They are the first recipients and 
implementers of earmarked funds.6 Figure 7 shows that in each year over the whole period of 
1990-2012 between 4 and 26 multilateral organizations are reported to be first-time recipients 
of earmarked funding.7 There is no decrease in the number of new organizations reported by 
donor countries. The bold line shows the increase in the number of organizations reported as 
receiving multi-bi aid. There is an accelerated increase in the number of receiving organizations 
between 2002 and 2007.8 The figure suggests that few organizations are involved at first but 
that earmarked funding has become widely accepted across multilateral organizations. It 
remains to be explored in how far this evolution is supply- or demand-driven and how 
competition for donor funds between multilateral organizations affected their decision to 
accept earmarked funds and the stringency of earmarking. 
We explored this pattern further by looking at the market share of the United Nations (UN), 
the World Bank Group, regional development banks, and other multilateral development 
organizations for the four different time periods used previously.9 There is surprisingly little 
variation in the relative importance of these groups of multilateral organizations over time, 
suggesting that there is not one multilateral organization that leads the earmarking trend. Of 
the total global earmarked funding, in all four time periods the UN and its sub-entities (i.e., 
funds and programs, and specialized agencies) receive around 50 percent, the World Bank 
Group between 15 and 25 percent, the regional development banks less than 5 percent. The 
remaining multilaterals jointly receive between 20 and 28 percent of earmarked aid, despite 
the increasing number of multilateral organizations within the category ‘other agencies’. In 
contrast to this aggregate analysis, there is substantial variation in the share of earmarked aid 
going to different multilateral organizations across donors within a time period and within 
donors over time. In the early 1990s, most donors provided the majority of their small amounts 
of earmarked aid to UN organizations and only the Netherlands, an early and relatively large 
provider of earmarked funding, already engaged with the World Bank to a substantial extent. In 
the late 2000s, the World Bank received a greater share of every donor’s earmarked aid. In 
                                                          
6 Most earmarked funds provided to multilateral organizations are pre-specified for specific countries, 
sectors, or focus areas but some money supports institutional capacity building, research on specific 
topics, or targets other programs and initiatives within a multilateral organization. 
7 We caution against over-interpreting the finding of a single year in the early 1990s as solid evidence 
because problems of underreporting were substantial. 
8 This might be due not only to the actual increase in aid-receiving organizations but also to 
improvements in data quality. 
9 Due to space constraints, no graphs are shown but they can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
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absolute terms, it continued to receive the most substantial amount of earmarked aid primarily 
from three donors, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.10  
Figure 7: The number of multilateral development organizations receiving earmarked aid 
 
Notes: The columns indicate the number of multilateral organizations (identified by the variable 
ParentID, see Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2014) first mentioned as recipients of earmarked aid in a given 
year (right scale). The line shows the total number of multilateral development organizations receiving 
any earmarked aid in a given year (left scale). 
These patterns in the data raise interesting research questions: What determines the ratio 
of earmarked to un-earmarked multilateral aid received by a multilateral organization? Is there 
a relationship between a donor’s influence in an organization and the supplied ratio of 
earmarked to unrestricted multilateral funds? What role does the mandate, the governance 
rule, and the effectiveness of the multilateral recipient play in a donor’s choice for providing 
earmarked or unrestricted voluntary funding to an organization? Eichenauer and Hug (2015) 
show some descriptive evidence that multilateral organizations evaluated as ‘better’ by donor 
countries receive both more earmarked aid and more unrestricted funding but there is still 
ample space in the literature to explore this relationship further.  
                                                          
10 The World Bank also receives substantial amounts of earmarked aid from the European Commission. 
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3.3 The ultimate recipients of earmarked aid 
We now turn to the ultimate beneficiaries of earmarked aid. According to interviews with 
officials from national aid agencies, donor governments resort to multi-bi aid when “bilateral 
aid is not an option” and there is a need “to fill gaps in the multilateral system” (IEG, 2011: 5). 
One such gap is the financing of global public goods (e.g., the environment or global health), 
which are challenges that must be addressed beyond the multilateral development banks’ 
country-based lending model. For each donor, we study whether earmarked funding is more 
focused on global activities than bilateral aid and/or if it is allocated to different sectors. In the 
following, all graphs use earmarked aid commitments provided by a donor country for purposes 
other than debt relief and humanitarian aid because we are interested in earmarked aid given 
for development purposes.11 Figure 8 shows that for the most important providers of 
earmarked funding the share of earmarked aid for global purposes increases over time. Only for 
the average European DAC donor, the share decreases from already low levels. For the non-
European DAC donors, the share is below 12 percent in all periods. We further compare the 
share of earmarked aid for global purposes with the corresponding share for bilateral aid. We 
find that the share of earmarked aid budget allocated to global activities is slightly lower for 
most donors. Generally, the Dutch use earmarked aid much less for global purposes than their 
bilateral aid. The other exceptions are the United Kingdom and, in the 1990s, the European DAC 
donors and the United States, which provide a higher share of bilateral than of earmarked aid 
for global public goods.  
We explored in some detail at the period level whether donors use earmarked aid to enter 
sectors not served by their bilateral aid but did not find any evidence that earmarked aid is 
complementary to bilateral aid (at the 5-digit purpose level of aggregation). Similarly, we did 
not find any evidence that donors use earmarked aid to engage in countries and territories 
where they do not have an own bilateral presence.12 While these observations are based on 
descriptive analysis only, they are in stark contrast to observations made in policy reports of 
international organizations. The IEG (2011: 5) describes donors’ statements about resorting to 
earmarked funding when “bilateral aid is not an option” and the OECD (2011: 7) notes that 
“there is growing pressure on the multilateral system to deliver in countries and regions where 
bilateral donors are exiting or unable to intervene.” Therefore, qualitative evidence about 
                                                          
11 Acht et al. (2015) show that humanitarian assistance is predominately channeled through non-state 
actors, which includes multilateral organizations. Debt relief is by definition earmarked for specific 
countries but granting debt relief commonly tends to be a multilaterally-coordinated effort.  
12 We tried several different thresholds to define a bilateral presence, e.g., annual commitments above 
10,000 USD or 100,000 USD, or more than three activities, or combinations thereof. These alternative 
ways of operationalization do not affect the conclusion that earmarked aid supports countries or sectors 
that already benefit from bilateral aid. 
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donors’ strategic composition of aid modalities and more rigorous data analyses of the 
differences in the allocation of donors’ bilateral and earmarked aid in terms of sectors, 
countries, and aid modalities is needed. Specifically, the complementarity of earmarked and 
bilateral aid between sectors within recipient countries and for each year should be considered, 
as there is substantial anecdotal evidence that earmarked aid is used in this way. Moreover, the 
(relative) efficiency and effectiveness of earmarked funding is under-researched.13 Earmarked 
aid may be more effective than bilateral aid if earmarked funding from various donors is pooled 
by the multilateral organization and, consequently, (within-sector) donor fragmentation in a 
recipient country is reduced. But earmarked aid might reduce aid efficiency due to higher 
transaction costs for donor countries, multilateral organizations, and recipient countries, or 
higher fragmentation on the ground if donor countries continue their bilateral aid activities in 
parallel.  
Figure 8: Global and regional activities as share of earmarked aid 
 
Notes: Global activities are all aid activities that are not earmarked for a specific recipient country. The 
graph shows the shares of the earmarked aid that is not country-specific as a share of total earmarked 
aid, averaged over the relevant time period, and, if applicable, over donors. 
                                                          
13 Barakat et al. (2012) systematically review the evidence on the effectiveness of earmarked funding 
pooled across donors (multi-donor trust funds) and note the lack of scientifically rigorous studies. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are not aware that this has changed. Reinsberg (2016) discusses the 
implications of earmarked funding on multilateral agencies and provides evidence that earmarked 
funding poses a governance challenge for the World Bank and may jeopardize organizational coherence. 
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Beside the lack of mechanisms for financing global public goods and the use of earmarked 
aid to venture into countries where bilateral aid is not an option, donors also note that the 
multilateral system falls short of having adequate institutions to respond “to emergencies such 
as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and the end of armed conflict.” We first examine 
whether country-specific earmarked funding has indeed been allocated to post-conflict 
countries to a larger extent than bilateral aid. Figure 9 shows the absolute increase in 
earmarked funding to post-conflict countries from around USD 5 billion in the 1996-2001 period 
to USD 18 billion in the last time period (2008-2012). We define countries as post-conflict in the 
first up to the fifth year after the end of a civil war or inter-state war.14 Although traditional 
bilateral aid still is more important for most recipient countries in absolute terms, donors 
increasingly resort to earmarked aid. This allows them to pool the risk of failure with other 
donor countries and to delegate the operational risks of engaging in post-conflict contexts to 
multilateral organization. In the years 2006-2012, all donor countries and groups provided a 
higher share of country-specific earmarked than of bilateral aid to post-conflict countries 
(Figure 10). This suggests that donors choose earmarked aid as an aid modality in particular 
when engaging in such contexts. A replication of figures 9 and 10 for countries in conflict gives 
similar results except that the number of states in conflict and the absolute aid amounts 
provided are higher (around USD 34 billion for 2008-2012).  
We end the descriptive analysis by analyzing the claim that earmarked aid is need to 
adequately respond to the occurrence of natural disasters in developing countries. While there 
is a general upward trend in the number of natural disasters, the variation between years is 
substantial and the peak years are in the early 2000s. In contrast, earmarked aid increases more 
smoothly over the last two decades. As the improvement of responsiveness to disasters is one 
of several motivations for providing earmarked aid, it is best explored in a multivariate 
regression framework, where other factors can be held constant. We offer such an analysis in 
the next section.  
In sum, we have illustrated in this section the multiple dimensions of the multi-bi aid data 
by showing pattern for the three types of actors involved in the earmarked funding, namely 
donor governments and their aid-providing agencies, multilateral development organizations, 
and recipient governments. Further, we have suggested avenues for future research on each of 
the actors individually and on their interactions. In the next section, we apply the new data for 
investigating the motives and determinants of donors’ differential use of earmarked aid using 
more rigorous statistical methods. 
 
                                                          
14 We refer to Appendix A for more details on the definition and data sources. 
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Figure 9: Earmarked aid to post-conflict countries 
 
Notes: Earmarked aid to post-conflict countries (i.e., in the first to fifth year after the end of a civil or 
international war).  
 
Figure 10: Share of bilateral and earmarked aid provided to post-conflict countries 
 
Notes: Share of earmarked (‘pure’ bilateral) aid in total country-specific earmarked (‘pure’ bilateral) aid 
to post-conflict countries. 
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4. Donor- and recipient-level determinants of donors’ earmarked aid budgets: a first 
application of the multi-bi aid data 
As we have shown above, donors’ use of earmarked aid is all but homogeneous. Given the 
theoretical advantages earmarked aid offers to donor countries, this is puzzling. Earmarking 
allows donor countries to delegate responsibility and to pool risks with other donors while 
simultaneously being able to target resources according to their priorities, demand tailored 
reporting, and reap the benefits of increased visibility relative to (un-earmarked) multilateral 
aid (OECD 2010). The puzzling observation about the heterogeneity in the use of earmarked aid 
across donor countries is yet unexplained in the literature. More generally, there is scant 
empirical evidence about the determinants of donor countries’ aid budgets which, as Fuchs et 
al. (2014) note, is in contrast to the extensive literature on the allocation of aid across 
developing countries and on aid effectiveness. This lack of research on donor generosity is also 
in stark contrast to the obvious relevance of such a research agenda. Despite repeated calls for 
innovative and private sources of finance, here still is an enormous financing gap for the 
ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the international community in 
September 2015 (UN 2015a; UN 2015b). The mobilization of ‘additional’ resources in donor 
countries will depend on donor governments’ (and private funders’) ability to target their 
resources according to their preferences. However, donors are likely to have divergent 
priorities when it comes to the 17 SDG goals and the 169 associated targets. When their 
preferences align, ‘like-minded’ donors might seek minilateral cooperation using earmarked aid 
to pool their resources and the implementing capacities of the existing multilateral institutions. 
Hence, we expect aid earmarked for specific topics and countries to increase further in both 
relative and absolute terms. 
4.1 Literature review  
Our research interest relates to three strands of research within the literature on foreign 
aid: donors’ choice of aid channels, the emerging literature on earmarked aid, and the 
determinants of donors’ total aid budgets. The first relevant strand of the literature offers 
theories about donors’ choice of bilateral and multilateral aid (Milner 2006; Milner and Tingley 
2013 for the U.S.), between multilateral organizations (Schneider and Tobin 2011), and 
between multilateral, bilateral and earmarked aid (Eichenauer and Hug 2015). Particularly 
relevant to our empirical application is Milner’s (2006) argument that multilateral aid allows 
donor governments to credibly signal the non-political use of foreign aid to voters who are 
interested in the (humanitarian) effectiveness of their taxes spent abroad. Noting the challenge 
of assembling data on public opinion about foreign aid, she constructs a composite measure of 
favorable attitudes towards aid from different polls and uses two (single) imputation methods. 
Using these measures, she finds support for her argument that multilateral aid is higher if the 
public disapproves of the current level of the aid budget. Regarding multi-bi aid, the OECD 
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(2010: 14) argues that earmarking “can help mobilize and maintain public resources for 
development” in donor countries by increasing visibility relative to multilateral aid. We 
contribute to this strand of the literature by testing for a relationship between earmarked aid 
and the public’s opinion about supporting developing countries and, for EU countries, the 
public’s stance on whether their own government provides the “most useful help to the Third 
World countries” (Eurobarometer 2015).  
All of the papers mentioned in the previous paragraph explain the choice of the aid channel 
primarily by donor preferences, the domestic political economy in donor countries, and 
characteristics of the multilateral organization. Dietrich (2013), Knack (2014), and Acht et al. 
(2015) argue and show that donors take recipient characteristics into account when choosing 
how to deliver aid. This would be in accordance with donor commitments made in the Paris 
Declaration. All three papers thus use donor-recipient pairs as unit of analysis. Knack (2014) 
shows that donors bypass recipient country systems when the quality of budgetary and 
financial management capacity in the recipient country is weak. Using different measures for 
weak governance and corruption than Knack (2014), Acht et al. (2015) present cross-sectional 
evidence that donors decrease both the share and absolute amount of state-to-state aid to 
countries with weaker governance scores, whereas Dietrich’s (short) panel analysis (2013) 
shows that the share of aid that bypasses the government is higher in low-governance 
countries.15 The literature further argues that donor and recipient characteristics interact and 
that their bilateral relationships matter for their choice of aid modality. Acht et al. (2015) find 
that the economic self-interest of donors in recipient countries weakens donors’ rationale for 
bypassing the government. Dietrich (2016) shows that the share of ‘bypass’ aid a donor 
provides in low-governance countries interacts with the political economy in donor countries. 
Specifically, the market-orientation of donors’ economies, such as their stance on outsourcing 
public service delivery domestically, positively correlates with the degree of ‘bypassing’ 
recipient governments in weakly-governed countries.  
As suggested by this strand of the literature, we examine whether the use of earmarked aid 
is explained by an interaction of donor and recipient characteristics. We contribute to the 
literature by separately examining earmarked aid, a subset of the ‘catch-all’ bypass aid, and by 
analyzing earmarked aid over an extended period of time. While the analysis in Acht et al. 
(2015) is purely cross-sectional and relies on 2008 data, Dietrich’s (2016) study is based on the 
                                                          
15 Their respective definitions of non-state aid or ‘bypass’ aid differ from Knack (2014), who defines 
bilateral aid not provided through the country system as ‘bypassing’. In contrast, these authors define 
‘bypass’ aid as aid channeled through international and local non-governmental and international 
governmental organizations. Dietrich (2013) further includes other development actors such as private 
contractors and public-private partnerships in the definition of ‘bypass’ aid. We test below whether the 
definition of ‘bypass’ aid influences the results.  
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period spanning 2005, the first year the channel code variable was consistently used by donor 
countries, to 2011. Additionally, we test for the official donor motives about recipient need 
whenever quantitatively possible. Given the lack of such findings in Eichenauer and Knack 
(2016), we expect to find a weak or no systematic relationship between earmarked aid and 
post-conflict status or natural disasters due. In their study on the allocation of earmarked aid, 
these authors do not find statistical evidence that World Bank trust funds systematically 
disburse more aid to disaster-affected, post-conflict or fragile states although trust fund aid 
generally is more poverty and policy selective than ‘pure’ bilateral aid. Using the same data 
from the World Bank, Reinsberg et al. (2015b) include both donor- and recipient-related 
variables in their study of donors’ choice among single-donor, small-n multi-donor, and large-n 
multi-donor trust funds.  
Regarding the third strand of relevant literature, we rely on the recent review of the 
literature on the size of donors’ aid budgets (Fuchs et al. 2014). These authors apply Extreme 
Bounds Analysis to examine the robustness of the fifty-two determinants of donor generosity 
proposed in the previous literature. After such a consolidative effort, it is hard to avoid a too 
parsimonious or a too inflated specification. We thus include the five robust variables, 
identified by Fuchs et al. (2014), as main controls in our specification and describe them in the 
next section. In robustness checks, we add variables that are used in at least four of the studies 
summarized in Fuchs et al. (2014: Table 1). As we detail in the next section, we also include 
variables from the two other recent donor-centered papers that analyze various sub-
components of the aid budget. Brech and Potrafke (2013) and Fuchs and Richert (2015) study 
the relationship between different types of aid and, respectively, donor ideology and the 
characteristics of the aid minister. Neither considers earmarked aid as a category. All aid budget 
papers use donor countries as unit of analysis although some recipient-level variables are 
usually included. No study in this literature tests for statistical differences in the determinants 
of sub-components of donors’ aid budget. 
4.2 Estimation and data  
We examine donor- and recipient level factors potentially associated donors’ heterogeneous 
use of earmarked aid using a panel dataset of 23 OECD/DAC donors over the 1990-2012 period. 
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of earmarked aid commitments provided by a 
donor country for purposes other than debt relief and humanitarian aid. Aid commitments are 
commonly used in aid budget and aid allocation studies because donors exert full control only 
over commitments while aid disbursements also depend on the recipient countries and 
implementing organizations. Therefore, we prefer using absolute earmarked aid amounts 
rather than earmarked aid as percentage of total aid because the latter implies the assumption 
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of fixed aid budgets within which the different types of aid are re-allocated.16 The question of 
additionality versus re-allocation within a fixed aid budget is particularly unclear for earmarked 
aid (e.g., OECD 2010, Reinsberg et al. 2015a). There is also no consensus in the literature about 
how to model the process of allocation across types of aid. The allocation process can be 
modeled as a one-step decision in which the budget size and budget items are simultaneously 
determined or as a two separate choices in which first the budget size and then the budget 
allocation across aid types are determined. In using absolute amounts, we are also in line with 
the most recent contributions to the literature on aid budgets (Brech and Potrafke 2013; Fuchs 
and Richert 2015).17 While the rise of earmarked aid is primarily donor-focused, the recent 
literature has highlighted the importance of recipient characteristics and their interaction with 
donors’ political economies. In order to remain comparable to both the aid budget and the aid 
allocation literatures, we show results from specifications with the donor-year (Equation 1 
below) and donor-recipient-year (Equation 2 below), respectively, as the units of analysis.18 By 
using these two levels of aggregation we further ensure that the results are not driven by the 
research design. 
As described in the literature section, we examine three sets of arguments proposed to 
explain the use of earmarked aid. Regarding the official motives, we operationalize the claim 
that earmarked aid is provided in response to specific needs in recipient countries through two 
measures. In our donor-year regressions, we account for heightened reconstruction and 
development needs after natural disasters (beyond humanitarian needs) by first calculating for 
each donor-recipient pair the probability of bilateral aid assistance in the 1990-2012 period, 
multiplying this with the lagged number of disaster occurrences in the recipient country, and 
weighting it with the mean population size of the recipient country over the period.19 We then 
sum the variable for each donor across all recipient countries to obtain our measure of post-
disaster needs.20 In the dyadic specification, we simply use the lagged number of disasters that 
occurred in the recipient country. We measure post-conflict needs by aggregating over all 
                                                          
16 We also prefer absolute amounts over aid as a share of donor’s gross national incme because for the 
latter variable, the variation in the dependent variable might alternatively arise from the numerator or 
the denominator. Moreover, aid allocation studies always use absolute amounts as dependent variable. 
17 For missing values in the dependent variable, we assume no earmarked aid is provided and replace 
them with zero except for those eight country-years where a donor country also did not report aggregate 
bilateral aid flows where we leave values missing. 
18 The donor-recipient sample includes all possible dyadic relationships. As in the donor-year 
specification, we interpret missing values as zero aid. Before logging the variables, one is added. 
19 Appendix A provides details on the construction and the data sources of all variables. 
20 We use the time-constant probability of a dyadic relationship, which is less likely to be endogenous 
than a year-specific probability. Year-specific probabilities suffer from the temporal 
proximity/simultaneity of donor’s choice for a bilateral aid relationship and the transition of the recipient 
country in a particular state (e.g., (post-) conflict; low governance). 
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recipients the interaction between the donor-recipient aid probability and a dummy for post-
conflict status, which we define to be one in the first five years after the end of a civil war or an 
international war as we did for the figures above. In the dyadic setting, a dummy indicates a 
post-conflict country. 
Second, we test the ‘bypassing’ story, which suggests that donor countries, in particular 
those with market-oriented economies, avoid state-to-state aid to recipients with low 
governance and instead channel their aid through other development actors, such as 
multilateral organizations. We obtain our measure weak governance index by the aggregation 
of the dyad-specific product between the probability of receiving aid and a binary variable 
indicating weak governance, assigned to countries with a governance score in the lowest 
quintile.21 In the dyadic regressions, recipient governance is a standardized governance variable 
for all and not only weakly-governed recipient countries. Dietrich (2016) argues that donors’ 
stance domestic practice of outsourcing public service delivery is related to their likelihood of 
delegating the delivery of aid abroad. We test her argument following her definition of ‘liberal 
market economy,’ that is derived from the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature, and measured by 
the time-invariant binary variable market-oriented donor economy.22 The coordinated market-
economies are our baseline category.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between public opinion and earmarked aid at the 
donor level using two different survey questions. We collected the most recent survey data on 
the public’s opinion about helping developing countries from various sources (Appendix B). 
Across donor countries, over the last two decades responses have become more favorable 
towards supporting developing countries with approval being above 80% in all countries with 
recent survey results. Broadening Milner’s (2006) argument, such high levels of responses in 
favor of helping developing countries, which we assume here to extend to foreign aid as the 
means to do so, would allow governments to provide a low share of multilateral aid as no 
signaling to voters about the humanitarian usage of the aid budget is necessary.23 As a second 
and more precise survey question, we use data from the Eurobarometer (2015), which allows a 
time-series perspective on the public’s opinion about the ‘most useful help’ to developing 
countries. While support for the own government has decreased over time, international 
                                                          
21 To maximize the number of available observations, we construct a standardized measure of 
governance that combines (standardized) information from the average of the six World Bank 
Governance Indicators or the ICRG index on political stability. 
22 Market-oriented donor economies are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the Scandinavian 
countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland), the United Kingdom, and the United States (Dietrich 
2016). 
23 Applying Milner’s (2006) argument to this alternative question stretches her theory, which she tested 
using survey responses about the appropriateness of the own governments’ current aid budgets. 
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organizations are increasingly considered the most useful help for developing countries. 
Combining the observation of high approval for supporting developing countries and the public 
assessment that multilateral organizations are better suited to do so, it can be argued that 
earmarked aid should be the ideal tool for donor governments to simultaneously remain in the 
driver’s seat regarding aid allocation and signal responsiveness to the public’s preference for 
multilateral aid. Indeed, the share of respondents supporting multilateral implementation is 
positively correlated with earmarked aid (Eichenauer and Hug 2015: Figure 13). Due to the 
unbalanced panels of the survey data, we do not include the public opinion variables in the 
main regressions at the donor-year level but analyze them in separate regressions as we 
describe below. The two regression equations thus read: 
(1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 =
 β1 Post disaster needsit−1 +  β2  Post conflict needsit−1 +
 β3 Weak governance indexit−1 +  β5  Market oriented donor economyi ∗
Weak governance indexit−1 + ∑k βk Controlsikt−1 + θi + ϑt +  εit  
 
(2)  𝑙𝑛 (𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡
=  β1 N° of disastersjt−1 + β2  Post conflict countryjt−1
+  β3  Recipient governancejt−1 +  β4  Market oriented donor economyi
∗ Recipient governanceit−1 + ∑k βk Controlsijkt−1+ θi + ϑt +  εijt 
 
The index 𝑖 indicates the donor country, 𝑗 refers to the recipient country, 𝑡 stands for the 
calendar year, and 𝑘 identifies the number of donor and recipient controls described below. 
The variables of interest and all control variables are lagged by one period to reduce concerns 
about simultaneity and reverse causality. Note that not all regressions include donor fixed 
effects 𝜃𝑖  and that the coefficient for the dummy market-oriented donor economy is omitted 
when 𝜃𝑖  is included. To take into account that the propensity of donors to use earmarked aid is 
likely to be correlated over time and across recipient countries, we use robust standard errors 
clustered at the donor country level in both specifications. 
As main donor controls, we include the covariates used in Fuchs et al. (2014) and Fuchs and 
Richert (2015). These variables are donors’ logged GDP per capita, donors’ level of political 
globalization, a binary variable indicating the existence of an independent aid agency, and the 
logged population in former colonies of the donor country (ex-colonial population). Fuchs et al. 
(2014) and most previous studies on aid budgets find a robust positive relationship between 
the size of the aid budget and the lagged dependent variable, implying that aggregate ODA 
budgets are inflexible in the short-term. However, our time period includes only 20 years so 
that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable might give rise to the Nickell bias (Nickell 
1981). What is more, coefficients on the variables of interest must be interpreted as short-term 
relationships in dynamic models and we are interested mostly in the more fundamental 
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relationships. For these reasons of content and methodology, we include the lagged dependent 
variable only in some specifications and correct for the Nickell bias by estimating bias-corrected 
lagged dependent variable models using Anderson and Hsiao (1982) instruments.24 Following 
Brech and Potrafke (2013) and Fuchs and Richert (2015), who also analyze sub-components of 
ODA, we further control for trade openness, social expenditure as share of GDP and public debt 
as share of GDP. Finally, we control for the share of aid underreporting in donor-level 
regressions.25  
To decrease the risk of omitted variable bias due to a too parsimonious specification, we 
show specifications including additional covariates, which are used in at last four recent studies 
on aid budgets (based on the overview in Table 1 in Fuchs et al. 2014). These variables are 
(logged) peer effort, a binary variable for right-wing government, the share of FDI outflows from 
the donor country’s firms to developing countries as share of the donor’s GDP, and a number of 
variables related to the donor’s macroeconomic and fiscal situation: the fiscal deficit, GDP 
growth, and the unemployment rate.26 Data for the variables of interest and the controls come 
from different sources and sometimes have missing values, which entails efficiency losses and 
might result in biased results (e.g., Breitwieser and Wick 2016). Missing data are problematic 
for interpretation as changes in coefficients may result either from changes in the sample size 
or the combination of variables. As the literature commonly uses the original data despite these 
problems, our main results are based on the original data but we find our results to be robust 
to using multiple imputation for missing values, which requires imposing additional 
assumptions. Results for some variables, such as disasters, are more consistent.27 Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics for both units of analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
24 We follow Brech and Potrafke (2013) and use the STATA command xtlsdvc.  
25 The share of underreporting is computed as the share of the discrepancy between the aggregate 
bilateral aid amounts (including multi-bi aid, which the OECD records as bilateral aid) reported to the 
OECD and donors’ activity-level aid reports to the CRS over aggregate bilateral amounts. The share of 
underreporting controls for the low reporting by donor countries about their multi-bi and (‘pure’) 
bilateral aid in the early years of the CRS, noted as a problem by the OECD (2010). We do not control for 
aid underreporting in donor-recipient regressions because we rely on cross-section variation. 
26 Several other hypotheses have been popular in the literature but do not fulfill our criterion because 
the variable definition varies widely (e.g., operationalization of ‘diverging interests in domestic politics’), 
are already included in our main controls (income per capita, lagged aid, population, government size) or 
are simply not relevant for our time period (cold war dummy/cold war threat). 
27 Appendix C shows our main results using the data imputed with multivariate imputation and describes 
the imputation procedure. 
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4.3 Results  
In the first application of the new data, we seek to explain the variation in the use of multi-bi 
aid both across donors and for individual donors over time. While we prefer and mostly show 
fixed-effects regressions that account for unobserved donor heterogeneity and thus mitigate – 
but not eliminate – omitted variable bias, there is a trade-off involved when removing the 
variation across donor countries. Various potential determinants of earmarked aid effort are 
quite stable over time (e.g., GDP per capita) or do not vary at all (e.g., market-oriented donor 
economy). Note that we abstain from interpreting relationships as causal even when we find 
significant and robust correlations in the subsequent analysis because we do not have a 
stringent identification strategy for our variables of interest. As noted above, we lag all 
variables on the right-hand side of the regression equation to reduce concerns about 
simultaneity and reverse causality.28  
Main results at the donor level 
Our first results are based on regressions with the donor-year as the unit of analysis (Eq. 1). 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 account only for year-specific shocks affecting all donors (ϑt), which 
allows us to study differences between donor countries. In columns 3 through 8 we add donor-
fixed effects and thus interpret the estimated coefficients as within-donor relationships. Table 2 
tests two explanations for earmarked aid: recipient needs and the ‘bypass’-strategy of (market-
oriented) donor economies. We find that the occurrence of natural disasters in donor’s 
recipient countries is economically significant and positively correlated with earmarked aid in 
all specifications – whether or not we include donor-fixed effects and despite having removed 
humanitarian aid from the dependent variable. However, the coefficients on post-disaster 
needs are insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance when we add the 
interaction of interest (column 2), the full set of donor controls (column 7), or the lagged 
dependent variable instrumented following Anderson-Hsiao (1982) (columns 6 and 8).29 A one-
                                                          
28 Although this is weakness, the literatures on aid allocation or aid budgets have not yet solved the 
endogeneity of regressors in a satisfactory way. For example, Fuchs et al. (2014) use GMM estimators to 
account for the endogeneity of selected regressors. However, these estimators are criticized because the 
exclusion condition is often violated and because of arbitrariness in modeling (see, e.g., Bazzi and 
Clemens 2013). 
29 It is possible that lagging the disaster variable is not the right way to model the relationship with 
earmarked aid because aid responses to disasters might be more rapid than other types of aid, even for 
non-humanitarian disaster aid. On the other hand, disasters may occur towards the end of a calendar 
year so that most of the aid might be disbursed in the subsequent year. When we use the lagged number 
of disasters in the construction of post-disaster needs, the positive coefficient turns insignificant and 
reduces in size (not shown). 
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standard deviation decrease in post-disaster needs is associated with a reduction in earmarked 
aid of up to 42 percent.30 
Post-conflict countries do not receive systematically different amounts of earmarked aid. If 
anything, these countries seem to receive less (column 1). At this level of aggregation, there is 
also no evidence that a decrease in the average governance among weakly-governed or fragile 
countries (i.e., an decrease in the weak governance index) mobilizes earmarked aid. That is, 
there is no statistical support for the ‘unconditional bypass’ hypothesis that does not take into 
account donor characteristics (Dietrich 2013; Knack 2014; Acht et al. 2015). We re-visit the 
unconditional argument below using donor-recipient regressions, which have been used in the 
relevant literature and are more appropriate for addressing this question.  
Taking into account the political economy in donor countries, we find that market-oriented 
donor economies provide significantly more earmarked aid in general (column 2). Holding the 
weak governance index and all other values at their mean value, market-oriented donors 
provide almost seven times more earmarked aid.31 As the negative sign of the interaction 
shows, market-oriented donor economies provide significantly more earmarked aid than other 
donors when governance quality deteriorates. The statistical significance and the size of the 
interaction coefficient are robust to the inclusion of donor-fixed effects, additional covariates 
and the lagged dependent variable in the subsequent columns. In terms of quantitative 
importance, we find that a decrease in the weak governance index of one standard deviation 
increases earmarked aid from market-oriented donor countries by 125 percent and decreases 
aid from coordinated market economies by around 25 percent, though the coefficient for the 
weak governance index is imprecisely estimated (column 6).32  
Regarding the main controls, few variables turn out to be related to earmarked aid in 
statistically significant ways. Comparing donor countries in columns 1 and 2, we find that 
politically globalized donors provide more earmarked aid whereas those with colonial ties 
provide significantly less; this supports the hypothesis that (earmarked) aid is a substitute for a 
common colonial past (e.g., Fuchs et al. 2014). Accounting for time-invariant donor 
characteristics, we find that past colonizers increase earmarked aid when they observe 
population growth in their former colonies. There is some weak evidence that highly indebted 
countries provide less earmarked aid but, conditional on the level of debt, is associated with 
more earmarked aid – potentially to the detriment of other aid channels, as we will explore 
                                                          
30 Based on column 3, 100*(exp(-19.574) -1) *0.43=-42.999 
31 Based on column 2, 100*(exp(-0.473*28.13+15.331) -1) =658.0 
32 Using the point estimates from column 6, a one-standard deviation decrease in governance result 
leads to: for market-oriented donor governments, 100*(exp(0.396-0.077) -1) *3.33= 125.1, and for 
coordinated market economies: 100*(exp(-0.077) -1)*3.33= -24.6. 
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below. As mentioned above, aid inertia has been found to be one of the primary explanatory 
factors for aid budgets but the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable risks creating a Nickell 
bias in our relatively short panel. Reassuringly, the size and sign of the coefficients of interest 
are largely stable to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (column 5) and its 
Anderson-Hsiao-instrumented version (columns 6 and 8).33 We find that a one percent increase 
in earmarked aid in the previous year is associated with around 0.3 percent more earmarked 
aid in the next year. The coefficient size implies that inertia for earmarked aid is low compared 
to total aid commitments and particularly to aid disbursements (Fuchs et al. 2014; Fuchs and 
Richert 2015). 
Our main results are unaffected by the inclusion of additional variables popular in the aid 
budget literature although some of the main controls lose their statistical significance (column 
7). Among the additional variables, we find that FDI outflows from donor countries are strongly 
related to the amount of earmarked aid and peer effort to be negatively associated with own 
efforts, which has been interpreted as evidence that donors view (earmarked) aid as an 
international public good (Schweinberger and Lahiri 2006; Fuchs et al. 2014). Accounting for aid 
inertia in column 8 does not affect the findings for the extended donor controls.  
Main results at the donor-recipient level 
Given our interest in several recipient-level factors, Table 3 shows regressions at the donor-
recipient level as specified in equation (2). The use of dyads as units of analysis is common in 
the aid allocation literature and is used by all studies on ‘bypass’ aid (Dietrich 2013; Knack 2014; 
Acht et al. 2015; Dietrich 2016). Most importantly, the results show that our main finding about 
the use of earmarked aid in fragile countries does not hinge on the unit of analysis. In the first 
and most parsimonious regression, we find that disaster-affected, post-conflict and weakly-
governed countries receive significantly more earmarked aid (column 1). This is in contrast with 
results at the aggregate level, where we did not find statistical evidence that post-conflict and 
fragile countries were unconditional beneficiaries of earmarked aid. When additional recipient 
and donor controls are introduced in the subsequent columns, the coefficient on disasters and 
on recipient governance turns insignificant and reduces in size, where the latter is in line with 
previous results. Substantially, a ten percent increase in the number of disasters is associated 
with a 5.8 percent increase in earmarked aid for the recipient country (column 1). Post-conflict 
countries receive 85 percent more aid than peaceful countries or countries in conflict.34 
According to column 1, a decrease in the governance scale by one standard deviation increases 
                                                          
33 We do not report the non-instrumented dynamic regression of column 8 but results are available upon 
request. 
34  Based on column 1: 100*(exp(0.618)-1) =85.5. 
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earmarked aid on average by around 64 percent for coordinated donor economies and about 
126 percent for market-oriented donor economies.35 We add our main donor controls and 
recipient controls in column 2 and the extended donor controls in column 3. The coefficients on 
disasters and recipient governance turn insignificant while the interaction is marginally 
insignificant.  
Based on the aid allocation literature, we include the most common covariates at the 
recipient level: recipient need is measured by (logged) recipient GDP per capita and recipient 
population. Political relationships are accounted for by UNGA alignment, which measures the 
distance between the ideal points of a donor-recipient pair based on voting in the UN General 
Assembly and by a dummy for a shared colonial history with the donor.36 Recipient trade 
openness captures the importance of international trade for the recipient country. In line with 
the previous literature, we do not include recipient-fixed effects (Dietrich 2013; Knack 2014; 
Acht et al. 2015) because the quality of governance in recipient countries is highly persistent, 
leaving little for the variables of interest to explain. Column 2 shows that earmarked aid is 
allocated to poorer countries with growing populations. The negative sign on colonial history 
supports the hypothesis that (earmarked) aid is a substitute for a common colonial past (e.g., 
Fuchs et al. 2014). In column 3, we add the extended set of donor-specific variables. This does 
not change the results in any significant way. 
Columns 4 through 6 replicate these specifications but limit the sample to the 1990-2001 
period to test whether motives changed over time. Most notably, the interaction coefficient is 
positive although insignificant, suggesting that in this time period market-oriented donors did 
not systematically use earmarked aid in low-governance countries to a larger extent than their 
peers. This finding might be due to the relatively limited number of donors providing 
substantial amounts of earmarked aid in the 1990s, among which the Netherlands, a pioneer 
donor in earmarked aid, is categorized as a coordinated economy in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ 
literature. Interestingly, there seems to be a negative association between UNGA alignment 
and earmarked aid in some regressions. This could suggest that donors use earmarked aid 
when they do not want to be observed as engaging with a donor government bilaterally for 
some reason. Alternatively, the effect might be driven by the Scandinavian donors and the 
Netherlands that were found to be pioneers of earmarked aid and are known for their 
‘altruistic’ aid allocation (e.g., Berthélemy 2006).37 Our main findings for the full period are 
                                                          
35 Based on column 1: for coordinated economies, 100*(exp(0.683)-1) *0.65=63.7, and for market-
oriented donor countries, 100*(exp(0.683+0.393)-1)*0.65=125.6.  
36 When we include the dyadic colonial history dummy, we exclude (ln) ex-colonial population from the 
donor controls. 
37 Sweden was not identified as ‘altruistic’ donor due to data availability (Berthélemy 2006). 
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robust to focusing on the 2002-2012 period (Columns 7-9). In this more recent period, the 
coefficient on the post-conflict dummy is statistically less pronounced but of similar size. Most 
notably, we find earmarked aid to be used in low-governance contexts statistically and 
economically significantly only by market-oriented donor economies. That is, there is no 
evidence for the ‘unconditional’ bypass argument in the most recent decade for the more fully 
specified models in columns 8 and 9. 
In Table 4, we focus on different types of ‘bypass’ aid. To allow for a comparison of our 
results with those in Dietrich (2016), we focus on the years 2005-2011.38 The dependent 
variable in columns 1-2 is the (logged) aid that ‘bypasses’ the government as defined in Dietrich 
(2016). ‘Bypass’ aid refers to aid channeled through multilateral organizations, NGOs, and other 
development actors. The coefficient on the interaction term is larger than in previous tables 
and significant at the 5 percent level. To study which type of ‘bypass’ aid drives the results, we 
disaggregate ‘bypass aid’ by (ln) earmarked aid and (ln) bypass aid net of multi-bi aid (OECD 
2013) in columns 3-4 and 5-6 respectively, also focusing on the 2005-2011 period. For 
earmarked aid, we find that the coefficient on the interaction is economically substantial 
although marginally insignificant in column 3, turning statistically significant in column 4 
through the inclusion of the extended donor controls. In columns 5 and 6, the interaction 
coefficient is statistically insignificant and of smaller size. This suggests that ‘bypass’ aid other 
than earmarked aid is used more heterogeneously than earmarked aid by market-oriented 
donor economies in fragile countries. For example, donors might only be able to fund NGOs in 
countries with sufficient levels of political freedom. More generally, these findings suggest that 
future research should further disentangle the concept of ‘bypass’ aid to improve our 
understanding of donor practice in disaster-struck, post-conflict, and fragile countries. Donor 
practice and outsourcing to other development actors in these challenging contexts is likely to 
interact with donor characteristics because of differences of prevailing theories and beliefs 
about the best strategies to support these recipient countries. Interestingly, earmarked aid is 
substantially more need-oriented and negatively correlated with colonial history, which is in 
contrast to either all or other ‘bypass’ aid. 
Earmarked aid and public opinion 
Next, we statistically explore the relationship between public opinion and earmarked aid using 
the donor country as unit of analysis. The cross-country survey data is highly unbalanced and 
we therefore prefer to run a regression on the mean values of all variables, averaged over the 
                                                          
38 It would be interesting to test for temporal heterogeneity in donors’ use of different types of ‘bypass’ 
aid but, unfortunately, the data about the channelcode for aid intermediaries other than multilateral 
organizations are missing for years prior to 2005. 
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1990-2001 and 2002-2012 period respectively (see Appendix B). The top panel of Table 5 shows 
that public support for foreign aid neither explains differences in the use of earmarked aid 
between donors (column 1) nor (robustly) within-donor variation (columns 2 and 3). To test our 
argument that donor governments may use earmarked aid to simultaneously satisfy the 
public’s mistrust about bilateral aid and keep using aid as a foreign policy tool, columns 3 to 6 
instead include the share of respondents that consider their own government as the “most 
useful help to the Third World countries.” This question is available for all EU countries for five 
years (1991, 1994, 1996, 2009, 2010), so that we again resort to averaging all variables within 
the 1990-2001 and 2002-2012 periods respectively but limit our sample to EU countries. We 
find a significant negative association between the earmarking trend and the public’s opinion 
about the helpfulness of their own government for developing countries. A one percent 
reduction in favorable opinion about the own government translates to a more than a doubling 
of earmarked aid.39 Although the economic and statistical significance of the coefficient is 
robust to the inclusion of fixed effects and control variables, the finding may result from 
coinciding but unrelated trends and is far from being causally identified.  
The finding might be used to advocate for a broadening of Milner’s (2006) argument. When 
public opinion towards bilateral aid is unfavorable, a donor government may use delegation to 
a multilateral organization to signal ‘altruistic’ motives to the domestic audience. Earmarked aid 
allows for partial delegation. Specifically, a government may keep (most) control over the 
allocation and the timing of earmarked disbursements by trust funds. Thus, earmarked aid 
allows to simultaneously increase usage of multilateral organizations and to employ as a foreign 
policy tool. 40 Rows 3-6 explore whether public opinion questions are also associated with the 
bilateral and multilateral aid budgets. We find an unconditional positive but economically and 
statistically weak correlation between bilateral aid and favorable opinions about the 
helpfulness of the own government which disappears when we add variables and fixed effects. 
No other economically or statistically significant relationships emerge. 
Comparison of the determinants of earmarked and bilateral aid 
Table 6 compares the determinants of earmarked aid budgets with those of bilateral aid 
budgets using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Zellner 1962).41 SUR accounts for the 
                                                          
39 Based on Column 4, Row 2: 100*(exp(0.749)-1) =111.5. 
40 The governance structure in each trust fund is different. Generally, allocation decisions are limited by 
the sector- and country-focus of the trust fund and depend upon agreement among the one or multiple 
contributing donors.  
41 While it would be interesting to compare earmarked aid, a hybrid between multilateral and bilateral 
aid, to the donor-level determinants of multilateral aid budgets, this is unconvincing when characteristics 
of (bilateral or earmarked) recipient countries are related to the size of the respective aid budgets (as we 
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correlation of disturbances between components of the total aid budget and thus improves on 
the efficiency of the estimation.42 It allows us to test for statistical differences between the 
point estimates obtained in different equations. We find the coefficient on the two variables of 
interest to be statistically different: earmarked aid is significantly more responsive to natural 
disasters than ‘pure’ bilateral aid and donor countries with market-oriented economies provide 
significantly more earmarked aid to low governance countries. The coefficients on the main 
donor controls suggest that bilateral and earmarked aid are determined by different factors. As 
in Fuchs et al. (2014) for aggregate aid budgets, bilateral aid budgets are significantly related to 
changes in donor wealth, donor’s multilateral engagement, and a donor’s colonial relationships. 
None of these factors is statistically related to earmarked aid. However, the differences 
between the respective coefficients are however not statistically different at conventional 
levels of statistical significance (demonstrated by the Wald test in the last column).  
We find that governments with a large share of social expenditures are also generous 
providers of both earmarked and bilateral aid. Interestingly, there is evidence that growing debt 
levels are associated with a reduction in bilateral aid but an increase in earmarked aid. The 
difference between coefficients is statistically significant. Future research could explore in more 
detail whether increasing debt levels are indeed associated with a shift away from bilateral aid 
towards earmarked aid. In combination with the comparatively low inertia for earmarked aid, 
one may speculate that earmarked aid is associated with less binding future commitments than 
other types of aid. Bilateral aid often involves multi-year projects while multilateral aid is highly 
inflexible in the short term due to multilateral agreements and compulsory membership fees. 
For comparative purposes, we also estimated SUR at the dyad level. Table 7 shows that 
most variables of interest are associated in a significantly different manner with the allocation 
of earmarked and bilateral aid. Specifically, improved recipient governance increases bilateral 
aid from all donor countries while earmarked aid increases with deteriorating recipient 
governance, although significantly so only for market-oriented donor countries. In contrast to 
official donor rhetoric, we do not find earmarked aid to be preferred over bilateral aid as 
instrument to respond to disaster needs. Among the recipient-level variables, there are only 
few significant differences between both aid channels: Earmarked aid is more poverty-selective 
than bilateral aid, in line with findings by Eichenauer and Knack (2016). For the remaining 
recipient-level variables, the size and signs of coefficients are similar.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
find them to be). By the definition of multilateral aid, which is pooled and allocated by the multilateral’s 
governing board, donors’ multilateral contributions cannot be motivated by conditions in donor-specific 
recipient samples in the same way as country-specific bilateral or earmarked aid. 
42 The correlation between (the logarithm) of earmarked aid and bilateral (multilateral) aid is 0.31 (0.36) 
while multilateral and bilateral aid are highly correlated (0.88). 
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In sum, we find mixed evidence about donors’ use of earmarked aid being associated with 
recipient needs after natural disasters, one of the official motives for multi-bi aid. At the donor-
recipient level, the more appropriate unit of analysis for recipient variables, we find statistical 
evidence that earmarked aid specifically targets post-conflict countries, another official donor 
motive. We find that donors differ in their choice of aid modalities when it comes to engaging 
in weakly-governed countries. There is robust evidence at both levels of analysis that market-
oriented domestic economies bypass weakly-governed governments by outsourcing aid 
delivery to multilateral organizations. We also show some preliminary evidence that 
multilateral organizations might be the preferred intermediary to circumvent recipient 
governments. However, donors’ choice of the ‘bypass’ channel might further depend upon 
factors such as the political regime in the recipient country. Thus, further research is required 
to understand donors’ strategic choice of intermediary when bypassing recipient governments 
or engaging in post-conflict and post-disaster contexts. 
Regarding public opinion, we find no robust relationship between earmarked, bilateral, or 
multilateral aid and the share of respondents that is in favor of supporting developing 
countries. We find a robust negative association between earmarked aid and the public’s 
opinion about the usefulness of their own government in helping developing countries, 
broadening Milner’s (2006) argument about the governments’ rationale for multilateral aid. 
While we abstain from making causal claims in general, we note that the relationship between 
public opinion and earmarked aid in particular might just be the result of coinciding but 
unrelated trends and call for more research on this important topic.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper introduces an original dataset on earmarked or multi-bi aid that is provided by 
donor countries to multilateral development organizations and managed in trust funds before 
allocation and implementation according to donors’ pre-specified priorities. The new data allow 
researchers to analyze earmarked aid over an extended period of time using refined 
information about the multilateral recipients and the earmarking stringency of individual aid 
activities. Our descriptive analysis of the actors affected by the earmarking trend highlights 
patterns in the data that future research may analyze and contribute to the literatures on aid 
budgets, the choice of the aid channel, aid allocation across sectors, countries, and aid 
modalities, and the effectiveness of aid. 
In a first application of the data, we analyze three explanations for earmarked aid at two 
levels of analysis. First, we find some mixed evidence that donors’ use of earmarked aid is 
associated with official donor motives for earmarked aid. At the donor-level, we find a positive 
32 
 
relationship with needs after natural disasters and, in the dyadic regression, with needs in post-
conflict countries. Second, we contribute to the literature on the ‘bypassing’ of recipient 
governments with low quality of governance by focusing on earmarked aid, one type of ‘bypass’ 
aid, and by analyzing an extended time period. We find that only market-oriented donor 
economies use earmarked aid in low-governance countries. Our results also suggest that 
‘bypass’ aid, a catch-all term for all aid that is not government-to-government, might be more 
heterogeneous than discussed in the previous literature. Third, we analyze the relationship 
between earmarked aid and public opinion, using two different survey questions: we find no 
relationship between the share of respondents in favor of supporting developing countries and 
either multilateral, bilateral, or earmarked aid. However, decreases in the public’s opinion 
about the usefulness of their own government in helping developing countries is associated 
with increases in earmarked aid.  
In terms of policy implications, the relatively low inertia of earmarked aid budgets over time 
may suggest that donors are willing and able to mobilize substantial amounts of earmarked aid 
for a specific country or issue in the short term. On a more negative note, low inertia may imply 
that earmarked aid is more easily reduced in response to economic downturns and distress of 
donors’ government finances although no evidence for this relationship has been found so far 
(see above and Reinsberg et al. 2015a). In contrast, increasing debt levels to be associated with 
a shift towards earmarked aid, while bilateral aid is negatively related to increasing debt levels. 
More generally, we find that earmarked aid levels are determined by different factors than 
bilateral aid: market-oriented donor economies allocate significantly more earmarked aid to 
weakly-governed countries. There is some mixed evidence that earmarked aid is allocated to a 
larger extent than bilateral aid to disaster-affected and post-conflict countries. Our findings 
suggest complementarities between bilateral and earmarked aid and between ‘bypass’ actors, 
which future research should seek to understand in more detail. In particular, earmarked aid 
might complement donors’ bilateral aid across sectors within the same recipient country. 
This paper has raised many research questions about the actors, the motives, and the 
consequences of earmarked aid and offers improved data to study these questions. Important 
research agendas include but are not limited to the efficiency and effectiveness of earmarked 
aid, the timing of the rise of earmarked aid and its frontrunners, and the implications of 
earmarked aid for multilateral organizations. We hope that the new multi-bi aid data 
contributes to furthering our understanding of the role of earmarked aid within the larger aid 
architecture.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics      
      
Descriptives at the donor-year level N Mean SD Min Max 
Earmarked aid (2011 constant USD) 521 1.51E+08 3.01E+08 1.00E+00 3.16E+09 
Bilateral aid (2011 constant USD) 521 3.73E+09 5.48E+09 3.98E+07 3.15E+10 
Post-disaster needs 521 5.28 0.43 3.57 5.93 
Post-conflict needs 521 364.92 126.15 78.96 638.93 
Weak governance index 521 28.13 3.33 20.31 34.44 
Market-oriented donor economy 521 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Public support for aid (%) 204 80.95 11.63 34 97 
Own government is most useful (%) 69 6.42 4.59 0.40 19.25 
GDP per capita (2011 constant USD) 521 29,197.77 11,674.88 7339.71 90,888.71 
GDP growth (%) 521 2.47 2.63 -8.27 11.27 
Social expenditure (% GDP) 520 21.33 5.79 2.7 35.5 
Public debt (% GDP) 466 65.58 32.95 7.51 192.75 
Public deficit (% GDP) 489 1.94 4.76 -18.7 32.3 
Unemployment (%) 490 7.11 3.48 1.56 22.05 
Right-wing government 521 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Independent aid agency 521 0.57 0.5 0 1 
Political globalization 498 88.43 9.73 45.84 98.43 
Trade openness (% GDP) 492 80.01 51.67 15.92 333.53 
FDI outflows (% GDP) 478 2.92 16.89 -8.45 221.37 
Ex-colonial population  521 11.21 10.3 0 24.72 
Peer effort (2011 constant USD) 501 3.10E+09 3.40E+09 1.16E+08 1.14E+10 
Aid underreporting 521 0.27 0.3 0 1 
      
 
Table 1 continues on the next page 
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Table 1 continued 
 
Descriptives at the donor-recipient level                    N  Mean SD Min Max 
Earmarked aid (2011 constant USD) 46,012 2.07E+08 3.50E+08 0 3.16E+09 
Bypass aid (2011 constant USD) 46,012 2.06E+06 1.05E+07 0 5.74E+08 
Bilateral aid (2011 constant USD) 46,012 2.00E+07 1.10E+08 0 4.65E+09 
Disasters  30,191 4.63 4.26 2 38 
Post-conflict country 46,012 0.25 0.47 0 2 
Recipient governance 39,072 -0.51 0.65 -2.4 1.55 
Market-oriented donor economy 46,012 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Recipient GDP per capita (constant 
international dollar) 39,933 2,247.55 2,834.88 50.04 55,376.43 
Recipient population  40,415 4.96E+07 1.73E+08 9004 1.32E+09 
UNGA alignment 42,371 1.7 0.7 0 4.76 
Colonial history 41,182 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Recipient trade openness (% GDP) 40,813 75.3 38.31 0.18 349.26 
Donor GDP per capita (2011 constant 
USD) 46,012 31433.97 10663.61 11171.92 90888.71 
GDP growth (%) 46,012 2.09 2.36 -8.27 10.97 
Social expenditure (% GDP) 45,867 22.15 5.2 5.1 35.5 
Public debt (% GDP) 43,093 69.79 33.29 11.27 192.75 
Public deficit (% GDP) 44,374 2.13 4.87 -18.7 32.3 
Unemployment (%) 43,777 7.09 3.12 1.56 22.05 
Right-wing government 46,012 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Independent aid agency 46,012 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Political globalization 43,403 91.04 6.75 48.39 98.43 
Donor trade openness (% GDP) 42,255 75.28 47.39 15.92 333.53 
FDI outflows (% GDP) 44,607 2.81 16.09 -8.45 221.37 
Peer effort (2011 constant USD) 44,919 3.73E+09 3.56E+09 1.16E+08 1.14E+10 
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Table 2: Main results at the donor-level, 1990-2012       
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post-disaster needs 7.616** 5.504 19.574** 16.783* 14.802* 14.623 3.057 3.180    
 (3.604) (3.979) (8.567) (8.183) (8.197) (8.992) (9.275) (7.440)    
Post-conflict needs -0.024* -0.015 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.003    
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)    
Weak governance index -0.961 -0.464 0.017 0.053 0.105 0.077 0.349 0.454    
 (1.095) (1.019) (1.145) (1.037) (1.151) (0.561) (1.074) (0.731)    
Weak governance index * market-oriented 
donor economy 
 -0.473**  -0.532** -0.424** -0.396** -0.652*** -0.582*** 
 (0.207)  (0.198) (0.185) (0.162) (0.170) (0.181)    
Market-oriented donor economy  15.331**                      
 (6.159)                      
Lagged dependent variable     0.275** 0.320***  0.258*** 
    (0.102) (0.046)  (0.047)    
GDP per capita (ln) 2.080 0.912 -3.701 -1.791 -2.555 -2.606 -6.623 -6.088    
 (1.920) (2.264) (4.482) (4.709) (3.294) (4.020) (4.947) (5.545)    
Political globalization 0.280*** 0.244** 0.073 -0.010 0.048 0.048 -0.042 -0.034    
 (0.098) (0.094) (0.083) (0.091) (0.066) (0.066) (0.089) (0.096)    
Independent aid agency 0.572 0.300                      
 (0.848) (0.882)                      
Ex-colonial population (ln) -0.119** -0.091** 0.181** 0.081 0.102* 0.106 0.081 0.030    
 (0.046) (0.039) (0.079) (0.071) (0.054) (0.133) (0.125) (0.204)    
Trade openness (% GDP) -0.009 0.001 0.007 0.036 0.008 0.008 0.039 0.014    
(0.013) (0.018) (0.031) (0.032) (0.023) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036)    
Social expenditure (% GDP) 0.007 0.007 0.244 0.266 -0.005 -0.016 0.516** 0.360*   
(0.090) (0.092) (0.164) (0.170) (0.161) (0.138) (0.212) (0.209)    
Public debt (% GDP) -0.024* -0.015 0.021* 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.034** 0.087*** 0.074*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024)    
Aid underreporting -14.245*** -13.996*** -13.714*** -13.461*** -10.635*** -10.294*** -12.544*** -10.175*** 
 (1.397) (1.073) (1.668) (1.471) (1.350) (1.125) (1.811) (1.419)    
GDP growth (%)       0.156 0.167    
       (0.156) (0.145)    
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Table 2 continued         
Public deficit (% GDP)       -0.192 -0.142 
       (0.113) (0.095) 
Unemployment (%)       -0.131 -0.045 
       (0.170) (0.221) 
Right-wing government       -0.236 -0.183 
       (0.497) (0.556) 
FDI outflows (% GDP)       0.066*** 0.073*** 
       (0.010) (0.024) 
Peer effort (ln)       -7.554** -3.409 
              (3.392) (3.414) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor-FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instrumented lagged DV      AH  AH 
Number of observations 440 440 440 440 425 425 360 360 
Number of donor countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.60 
Within R2   0.64 0.66 0.69  0.64  
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) earmarked aid and covers the years 1990-2012. AH refers to the use of the Anderson-Hsiao instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Main results at donor-recipient level 
      
            1990-2012 1990-2001 2002-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Disasters (ln) 0.588*** 0.186 0.193 0.156* 0.076 0.041 0.925*** 0.208 0.215  
 
(0.152) (0.144) (0.164) (0.090) (0.098) (0.121) (0.217) (0.206) (0.221) 
Post-conflict country 0.618*** 0.394*** 0.379** 0.121** 0.116 0.081    0.863*** 0.447* 0.386 
 
(0.152) (0.140) (0.163) (0.053) (0.087) (0.095)    (0.257) (0.227) (0.236) 
Recipient governance -0.683*** -0.094 -0.044 -0.338*** -0.144 -0.027    -0.950*** -0.032 -0.018  
 
(0.108) (0.121) (0.139) (0.118) (0.166) (0.203)    (0.179) (0.173) (0.186) 
Recipient governance * market-
oriented donor economy 
-0.393* -0.364 -0.412 0.152 0.331 0.307    -0.669* -0.781* -0.822* 
(0.225) (0.245) (0.256) (0.196) (0.256) (0.285)    (0.372) (0.399) (0.399) 
Recipient GDP per capita (ln) 
 
-0.527*** -0.527** 
 
-0.379 -0.242    
 
-0.727*** -0.757*** 
 
(0.177) (0.194) 
 
(0.221) (0.236)    
 
(0.235) (0.246) 
Recipient population (ln) 
 
0.208** 0.221** 
 
0.106 0.129    
 
0.283** 0.290** 
 
(0.081) (0.091) 
 
(0.063) (0.077)    
 
(0.120) (0.125) 
UNGA alignment 
 
-0.169 -0.139 
 
-0.379* -0.529**  
 
-0.083 -0.058 
  
(0.190) (0.198) 
 
(0.209) (0.215)    
 
(0.252) (0.253) 
Colonial history 
 
-0.633*** -0.672** 
 
0.194 0.258    
 
-1.005*** -1.004** 
  
(0.219) (0.252) 
 
(0.205) (0.219)    
 
(0.349) (0.371) 
Recipient trade openness  0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.002    
 
-0.001 -0.001  
(% GDP) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002)      (0.003) (0.003) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main donor controls 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Extended donor controls     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Number of observations 28,065 21,742 19,246 9,455 7,546 5,902    18,610 14,196 13,344 
Number of donor countries 23 23 23 21 20 17    23 23 23 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.27 0.30 0.33    0.41 0.46 0.45 
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) earmarked aid. Main donor controls are GDP per capita (ln), political globalization, trade openness (% 
GDP), social expenditure (% GDP), and public debt (% GDP). Extended donor controls are GDP growth (%), public deficit (% GDP), unemployment 
(%), right wing government, FDI outflows (% of GDP), and peer effects (ln). Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country level. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Testing the ‘bypass’ story at the donor-recipient level, 2005-2011 
         All bypass aid Earmarked aid Other bypass aid 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disasters (ln) 0.347* 0.384* 0.263 0.292 0.256 0.254    
 
(0.176) (0.188) (0.236) (0.248) (0.179) (0.183)    
Post-conflict country 0.044 0.054 0.111 0.047 -0.165 -0.142    
 
(0.172) (0.179) (0.328) (0.340) (0.146) (0.145)    
Recipient governance 0.280 0.314 -0.081 -0.050 0.374 0.378    
 
(0.234) (0.245) (0.239) (0.258) (0.227) (0.240)    
Recipient governance * market-oriented 
donor economy 
-0.858** -0.865** -0.773 -0.842* -0.513 -0.487    
(0.344) (0.346) (0.488) (0.490) (0.313) (0.318)    
Recipient GDP per capita (ln) -0.047 -0.052 -0.920*** -0.956*** -0.125 -0.138    
 (0.177) (0.189) (0.270) (0.284) (0.173) (0.185)    
Recipient population (ln) 0.447*** 0.437*** 0.327** 0.320** 0.594*** 0.605*** 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.143) (0.087) (0.089)    
UNGA alignment -0.526 -0.601* 0.055 0.104 -0.691* -0.748**  
 
(0.350) (0.312) (0.275) (0.277) (0.342) (0.324)    
Colonial history -0.098 -0.042 -1.241*** -1.234** 0.330 0.399    
 
(0.386) (0.400) (0.429) (0.451) (0.312) (0.324)    
Recipient trade openness (% GDP) -0.005* -0.006** -0.002 -0.003 -0.005* -0.005*   
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main donor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Extended donor controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Number of observations 10,377 9,839 10,377 9,839 10,377 9,839 
Number of donor countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.80 0.49 0.48 0.77 0.77 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is (logged) bypass aid as defined in Dietrich (2016), (logged) earmarked aid in columns 3-4, and (logged) bypass aid 
net of earmarked aid in columns 5-6 and covers 2005-2011. Main donor controls are GDP per capita (ln), political globalization, trade openness (% GDP), social 
expenditure (% GDP), and public debt (% GDP). Extended donor controls are GDP growth (%), public deficit (% GDP), unemployment (%), right wing government, 
FDI outflows (% of GDP), and peer effects (ln). Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Earmarked aid and public opinion in donor countries    
        
  Dependent variable / main predictors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Earmarked aid (ln)             
(1) Public support for aid (%) 0.073 -0.193*** 0.046    
  (0.072) (0.059) (0.107)    
(2) Own government is most useful (%)    -0.749** -0.756** -1.084*** 
     (0.306) (0.288) (0.261) 
  Bilateral aid (ln)             
(3) Public support for aid (%) -0.036 -0.006 0.010    
  (0.023) (0.008) (0.007)    
(4) Own government is most useful (%)    0.095* 0.024 -0.035 
     (0.053) (0.034) (0.026) 
  Multilateral aid (ln)             
(5) Public support for aid (%) -0.017 -0.001 0.008    
  (0.019) (0.007) (0.007)    
(6) Own government is most useful (%)    0.066 0.001 -0.057 
      (0.048) (0.025) (0.040) 
 Period-FE   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
 Donor-FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Main donor controls   Yes   Yes 
 Number of observations 44 44 44 31 31 31 
  Number of donor countries 22 22 22 16 16 16 
Notes: The dependent variables are the averages for 1990-2001 and 2002-2012 for the aid variable as noted in italics. Main donor controls include post-
disaster needs, post-conflict needs, the weak governance index, the interaction between market-oriented donor economy and the weak governance index, 
GDP per capita (ln), political globalization, ex-colonial population (ln), trade openness (% GDP), social expenditure (% GDP), and public debt (% GDP). Robust 
standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Seemingly unrelated regression and Wald tests at the donor level 
     
  (1) (2)  (1)-(2) 
  Earmarked aid (ln) Bilateral aid (ln)  Difference / 
Wald test 
Post-disaster needs 16.783**  -0.572  17.355** 
 (8.370)    (0.660)   
Post-conflict needs 0.000    -0.003***  0.003 
 (0.010)    (0.001)   
Weak governance index 0.053    0.032  0.021 
 (0.635)    (0.050)   
Weak governance index * 
market-oriented donor 
economy 
-0.532*** 0.004  -0.536*** 
(0.121)    (0.010)   
GDP per capita (ln) -1.791    2.008***   -3.800 
 (3.449)    (0.272)   
Political globalization -0.010    0.017***  -0.027 
 (0.070)    (0.006)   
Ex-colonial population (ln) 0.081    -0.027***  0.108 
 (0.111)    (0.009)   
Trade openness (% GDP) 0.036    0.000  0.035 
 (0.028)    (0.002)   
Social expenditure (% GDP) 0.266*   0.045***  0.221 
 (0.141)    (0.011)   
Public debt (% GDP) 0.032**  -0.005***  0.037*** 
 (0.016)    (0.001)   
Aid underreporting -13.461*** -0.129  -13.332*** 
 (0.999)    (0.079)   
Year-FE Yes Yes    
Donor-FE Yes Yes   
Number of observations 440 440   
Number of donor countries 23 23   
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.95    
Notes: The dependent variables are (logged) earmarked and ‘pure’ bilateral aid respectively and 
cover the years 1990-2012. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country 
level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Seemingly unrelated regression and Wald tests at the donor-recipient level 
       (1) (2) 
 
(1)-(2) 
  Earmarked aid (ln) Bilateral aid (ln) 
 
Difference /  
Wald test 
Disasters (ln) 0.186** 0.267*** 
 
-0.081 
 
(0.084) (0.070)    
  Post-conflict country 0.394*** -0.182*** 
 
0.576*** 
 
(0.077) (0.065)    
  Recipient governance -0.094 0.563*** 
 
-0.656*** 
 
(0.091) (0.076)    
  Recipient governance * 
market-oriented donor 
economy 
-0.364*** 0.124 
 
-0.488* 
(0.122) (0.102)    
  Recipient GDP per capita (ln) -0.527*** 0.050 
 
-0.577*** 
 
(0.078) (0.065)    
  Recipient population (ln) 0.208*** 0.514*** 
 
-0.306*** 
 
(0.036) (0.030)    
  UNGA alignment -0.169** -0.348*** 
 
0.179 
 
(0.082) (0.069)    
  Colonial history -0.633*** -0.203**  
 
-0.429* 
 
(0.112) (0.094)    
  Recipient trade openness (% 
GDP) 0.000 -0.002**  
 
0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.001)    
  Donor-FE Yes Yes     
Year-FE Yes Yes 
  Main donor controls Yes Yes   
Number of observations 21,742 21,742 
  Number of donor countries 23 23 
  Adjusted R2 0.20 0.25     
Notes: The dependent variables are (logged) earmarked and ‘pure’ bilateral aid respectively and 
cover the years 1990-2012. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country 
level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Definitions and data sources for variables at the donor level 
 
Variable Description Source(s) 
Dependent variable(s)  
Earmarked aid (ln) Natural logarithm of earmarked aid (or “multi-bi aid”) 
commitments in 2011 constant USD net of earmarked aid 
devoted to humanitarian purposes and debt relief; pro-rata 
(multilateral) contributions to the four pass-through 
multilaterals (i.e., GAVI, GEF, GFATM, EU) that ultimately 
become earmarked aid are added to this amount (see 
Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2014). 
Multi-bi aid data 
Bilateral aid (ln) Natural logarithm of bilateral aid commitments in 2011 
constant USD net of earmarked aid flows channeled through 
multilateral organizations. 
OECD 2013 and Multi-bi aid 
data 
Multilateral aid (ln) Natural logarithm of multilateral aid commitments in 2011 
constant USD net of the pro-rata (multilateral) contributions 
to the four pass-through multilaterals (i.e., GAVI, GEF, 
GFATM, EU) that ultimately become earmarked aid (see 
Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2014). 
OECD 2013 and Multi-bi aid 
data 
   
Key predictors  
Post-disaster needs Donor- and time-varying measure of natural disasters in 
developing countries, one-year lag. Computation in three 
steps: (1) calculate the fraction of sample years in the period 
1990-2012 in which a donor committed a positive amount of 
‘pure’ bilateral aid to a specific recipient; (2) multiplication of 
the lagged number of natural disaster occurrences in each 
recipient country, the logged population of the recipient 
country (averaged over 1990-2012) and the fraction from (1); 
and (3) sum for each donor over all recipient countries. 
Probability calculated from 
OECD 2013; Disasters from 
EM-DAT database (CRED 
2015); Population originally 
from World Development 
Indicators and sourced from 
Teorell et al. 2013 
Post-conflict needs Donor- and time-varying measure of post-conflict 
reconstruction needs in developing countries, one-year lag. 
Computation in three steps: (1) calculate the fraction of 
sample years in the period 1990-2012 in which a donor 
committed a positive amount of ‘pure’ bilateral aid to a 
specific recipient; (2) multiplication of the probabilities from 
(1) with the logged population of the recipient country 
(averaged over 1990-2012) and a post-conflict indicator of a 
given recipient country and (a country is considered to have 
post-conflict status in the first five years after a conflict ends, 
a conflict can be either a civil war according to the 
UCDP/PRIO definition (Gleditsch et al. 2002) or an 
international war according to the COW definition; ongoing 
wars are not considered; if the conflict ends in the first half of 
a year, the post-conflict indicator turns one in the same year; 
if it ends in the second half, the indicator turns one the 
following year); and (3) sum for each donor over all recipient 
countries. 
Probability calculated from 
OECD 2013; Internal conflict 
data from UCDP/PRIO 
(Pettersson and 
Wallensteen 2015) and 
international conflict from 
COW (Sarkees and Weyman 
2016); Population originally 
from World Development 
Indicators and sourced from 
Teorell et al. 2013 
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Weak governance 
index 
Donor-varying measure of governance quality in developing 
countries, one-year lag. Computation in three steps: (1) 
calculate the fraction of sample years in the period 1990-
2012 in which a donor committed a positive amount of ‘pure’ 
bilateral aid to a specific recipient; (2) assign the binary 
indicator “weakly governed country” to each country with a 
governance level below the threshold of “weak governance” 
defined as those values in the lowest quintile in the annual 
governance distribution; and (3) aggregate to the donor level 
through the creation of a weighted average of the normalized 
governance level among the “weakly governed states”, 
where weights are given by the probability of a positive aid 
receipt (expressed in percent) and the logged population. 
Probability calculated from 
OECD 2013; Governance 
data from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators or 
the ICRG index (whichever 
values were not missing), 
population from the World 
Development Indicators, 
sourced from Teorell et al. 
2013 
Market-oriented 
donor economy 
Binary indicator variable for being a market-oriented “variety 
of capitalism”; donor countries with a market-oriented 
system include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
Dietrich 2016 
Own government is 
most useful (%) 
Percentage of national survey respondents to the question 
“[...] which one do you think provides the most useful help to 
the third world countries?” who answer the own (national) 
government, one-year lag. Response options vary over years 
but always include the own government and international 
organizations (international organizations (like the UN), the 
European Community/Union, and voluntary 
organizations/NGOs, business and industry/private 
companies). 
Eurobarometer 2015. 
Questions used are Q91 
(1991), Q69 (1994), Q81 
(1996), QF4 (2009), QD4 
(2010). 
Public support for aid 
(%) 
Percentage of national survey respondents who support 
foreign aid; exact wording of the question varies across 
countries. 
See Appendix B 
   
Control variables  
GDP per capita (ln) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the donor country in 
constant USD, one-year lag. 
OECD 2014 
GDP growth (%) Real growth of GDP in the donor country, one-year lag. OECD 2014 
Social expenditure  
(% GDP) 
Social expenditure of the donor government as percentage of 
GDP, one-year lag. 
OECD 2014 
Public debt (% GDP) Public debt level of the donor government as percentage of 
GDP, one-year lag. 
OECD 2014 
Public deficit (% GDP) Annual deficit of the donor government as percentage of 
GDP, one-year lag. 
OECD 2014 
Unemployment (%) Unemployment rate as percentage of the working 
population, one-year lag. 
OECD 2014 
Right-wing 
government 
Binary indicator of right-wing partisanship of the donor 
government, one-year lag. A donor is considered to be right-
wing partisan if its average ideological position is above the 
sample average; the average partisan position of the 
government is calculated using vote shares of the constituent 
parties as weights for coalition government. 
 
ParlGov data from Manow 
and Döring 2012 
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Independent aid 
agency 
Binary variable based on the classification of the four 
organizational models of bilateral aid provision (OECD/DAC 
2009), one-year lag. Independent aid agency as defined in 
Fuchs et al. (2014) and combines the management models 3 
and 4. 
Definition from Fuchs et al. 
2014; Classification from 
OECD 2009 
Model 1: Development co-operation is an integral part of the 
ministry of foreign affairs, which is responsible for policy and 
implementation. 
Model 2: A Development Co-operation Directorate has the 
lead role within the ministry of foreign affairs and is 
responsible for policy and implementation. 
Model 3: A ministry has overall responsibility for policy and a 
separate executing agency is responsible for implementation. 
Model 4: A ministry or agency, which is not the ministry of 
foreign affairs, is responsible for both policy and 
implementation. 
 
Political globalization KOF index, dimension covering political globalization, one-
year lag. 
Dreher 2006 
Trade openness  
(% GDP) 
Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP of the 
donor country, originally collected in the World Development 
Indicators, one-year lag. 
Teorell et al. 2013 
FDI outflows (% GDP) FDI outflows from the donor country to developing countries 
(non-OECD countries) as a percentage of GDP (of the donor 
country), one-year lag. 
OECD 2014 
Ex-colonial population 
(ln) 
Natural logarithm of the population living in ex-colonies of 
the donor country, one-year lag. 
Population from Teorell et 
al. 2013; Colonial ties from 
Mayer and Zignago 2006 
Peer effort (ln) Natural logarithm of net earmarked aid committed by all 
other DAC donors, one-year lag. 
Multi-bi aid data 
Aid underreporting  The share of underreported bilateral aid is calculated as the 
difference between the aggregated total bilateral aid 
reported by a donor country (Table DAC1a) each year and the 
sum of amounts reported as bilateral aid activities to the 
Creditor Reporting System divided by the aggregated bilateral 
aid. In an ideal world, the two sums would be equal but 
mostly they are not. We assume that reporting gaps are the 
same for bilateral aid (net of earmarked aid) and earmarked 
aid and interpret the share as the degree of underreporting 
in multi-bi aid. 
OECD 2013 
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Table A2: Definitions and data sources for variables at the donor-recipient level 
 
Variable Description Source(s) 
Dependent variable(s)  
Earmarked aid (ln) Natural logarithm of earmarked aid (or multi-bi aid) 
commitments from a donor to a recipient country in 2011 
constant USD net of earmarked aid devoted to humanitarian 
purposes and debt relief; pro-rata (multilateral) contributions 
to the four pass-through multilaterals (i.e., GAVI, GEF, 
GFATM, EU) that ultimately become earmarked aid are added 
to this amount (see Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2014). 
Multi-bi aid data 
Bypass aid (ln) Natural logarithm of bilateral aid commitments (2011 
constant USD) channeled through multilateral organizations 
(earmarked aid), non-governmental organizations, and other 
non-governmental development actors. 
OECD 2013 and Multi-bi aid 
data 
Bilateral aid (ln) Natural logarithm of bilateral aid commitments (2011 
constant USD) channeled through a donor’s own entity. 
OECD 2013 
   
Variables of interest  
Disasters (ln) Natural logarithm of the number of disaster occurrences in 
the recipient country drawn from the EM-DAT database, one-
year lag. 
CRED 2015 
Post-conflict country Binary post-conflict indicator of a given recipient country, 
one-year lag. A country is considered to have post-conflict 
status in the first five years after a conflict ends (a conflict can 
be either a civil war according to the UCDP/PRIO definition or 
an international war according to the COW definition; 
ongoing wars are not considered). 
Internal conflict data from 
UCDP/PRIO (Pettersson and 
Wallensteen 2015) and 
international conflict from 
COW (Sarkees and Weyman 
2016) 
Recipient governance Standardized governance value of the recipient country, one-
year lag (information from the World Bank Governance 
Indicators and the ICRG index have been combined in order 
to reduce missing data, comparability of the data are ensured 
due to normalization). 
Teorell et al. 2013 
   
Control variables  
Recipient GDP per 
capita (ln) 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the recipient country, 
based on the World Development Indicators, one-year lag. 
Teorell et al. 2013 
Recipient population 
(ln)  
Natural logarithm of the population of the recipient country, 
based on the World Development Indicators, one-year lag. 
Teorell et al. 2013 
UNGA alignment Ideal-point distance between the donor country and the 
recipient country based on all votes in the United Nations 
General Assembly, one-year lag. 
Bailey et al. forthcoming 
Colonial history Binary indicator variable that is one if the recipient country 
was a former colony of the donor country.  
CEPII database (Mayer and 
Zignago 2006) 
Recipient trade 
openness (% GDP) 
Sum of imports and exports of the recipient country as a 
percentage of GDP, based on UN Comtrade data, one-year 
lag. 
Teorell et al. 2013 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Share of respondents in favor of supporting developing countries  
(Figures for 1990-2002 from McDonnell et. Al. (2003), sources for 2003-2014 see below). 
 
          1990s 2000s 
Country / Year: 
Support in % 
  
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 
Australia (a)     72    84   85              
 (b)             86 87 89 91          
Austria1    60 71  66 63  57 86  83 69  86     78 87 85 83 82 87 
Belgium        67  55    61  86     81 87 83 85 80 84 
Canada2 (a)    79 64 57  72 75    83             
 (b)                  68 74 75 79     
Denmark       75 83 73 84    93  94     92 94 90 94 85 85 
Finland3        77 34 70 51 60  92  91     92 94 91 88 85 85 
France        78  70    74  88     86 86 82 82 76  
Germany        75  66  75  79  91     89 89 92 90 89 91 
Greece4        90  87    94  95     88 90 83 81 77 85 
Ireland  89      91  82 95   85  94     92 85 85 88 85 87 
Italy        87  78    93  94     90 87 84 82 78 80 
Japan (a) 79 83 80 78 79 79 80 76 70 72 64 75              
 (b)               68    75       
Luxembourg        91  75    95  93     88 83 92 89 89 91 
Netherlands          75    92  93     86 88 87 87 82 88 
New Zealand           71     76   76        
Norway (a) 77    85  84   88                
 (b)           88 88 89 89 89 90 90 90 89 89 88 86 84 83  
Portugal        89  78    78  88     93 92 88 78 86 93 
Spain  58    67  94  95  84  88       93 94 88 88 84 90 
Sweden  65 65 54 63 62 59 52      92  96     93 96 97 97 95 97 
Switzerland      78     76     75     83      
UK   85 75   81     69 71 78  91     87 91 81 85 81 82 
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United States (a)  41   45    47                 
 (b)      80     79               
 (c)                 72 66        
  (d)             74  70      62     
Notes from 
McDonnell et al. 
(2013): 
1. Austria, 1999: the question ‘Is development co-operation right?’ was added to a survey on fair trade: 86 per cent of 
respondents said it was right. 
 
2. Canada, 1997: National budget deficit was eliminated in 1997. A marked increase in support for development assistance is 
observed between the first poll in February 1997 and the second one in August.  
 3. Finland 1997 and 1999: percentage of population that considers foreign aid to be an integral part of foreign policy.  
 4. Greece became a member of the DAC in 1999.                
Sources: Figures for 1990-2002: Table 2 in Mc Donnell et al. (2003). 
 
EU Member States: figures for 2003-2014 from Eurobarometer (2015) (corresponding to ascending years: questions 58.2, 62.2, 
71.2, 73.5, 76.1, 77.4, 79.4 and 82.1). The question asked was: “In your opinion, it is very important, important, not very 
important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” The figure in 
the Table is the sum of respondents stating that it is very important or important to help people in poor countries.  
 New Zealand: figures for from UMR Research Limited (2007). 
 Switzerland: figures from Bieri (2010). 
 
Canada (a) & (b): figures for 1993-2010 from Silvio (2015). (a) is the (combined) strong and mild public support for Canadian aid. 
(b) is the percentage of respondents that state that the volume of aid should be increased or remain the same. 
 United States (c): figures for 2006 & 2007 from German Marshall Fund (2007).  
 United States (d): figures for 2002, 2004 & 2010 from The Chicago Council of Global Affairs (2010).  
 Japan (b): figures for 2004 & 2008 from Uchida (2009). 
 Norway (b): figures for 2001-2013 from Statistics Norway (2013). 
 Australia: figures for 2001-2005 from Figure 7 in Williams (2013).  
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Appendix C 
 
Description of the imputation procedure 
 
Any imputation algorithm assumes that the data are missing at random (MAR), implying that the absence can be explained by the observed data. In 
our case, we assume that missing observations in the control variables for a given donor are not systematically related to its multi-bi aid. We opt 
for an imputation model that consists of the donor dummies and the year dummies and that uses a uniform prior. We create 20 imputations of the 
data, following guidance that a lower number of imputations may not be sufficient to capture the cross-sample variability of the imputed estimates 
(Graham et al. 2007). Furthermore, we require that imputations respect the logical bounds of the respective variables, notably for non-negative 
variables and ordinal variables. Our reported point estimates reflect the average coefficient from all imputations. We adjust standard errors to take 
into account the cross-sample variance of the respective estimates (Rubin 1987).  
 
Table C1: Main results with imputed data (corresponds to Table 2) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post-disaster needs 7.917* 4.724 21.198** 17.840** 15.966** 15.827** 16.868** 14.584**  
 (3.852) (4.172) (7.664) (8.050) (6.986) (6.980) (7.934) (7.300)    
Post-conflict needs -0.023* -0.011 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.004    
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)    
Weak governance index -0.878 -0.309 -0.047 0.018 0.128 0.117 0.007 0.106    
 (0.854) (0.835) (0.800) (0.750) (0.782) (0.662) (0.737) (0.709)    
Weak governance index * Market-oriented 
donor economy 
-0.426**  -0.375** -0.315** -0.292** -0.426** -0.327**  
(0.169)  (0.164) (0.150) (0.117) (0.171) (0.128)    
Market-oriented donor economy  14.113**                      
  (4.977)                      
GDP per capita (ln) 2.091 1.205 -7.357* -6.802* -4.833 -4.630 -7.595* -4.608    
 (1.613) (1.837) (3.737) (3.921) (2.860) (3.050) (4.024) (3.342)    
Social expenditure (% GDP) 0.053 0.049 0.284* 0.233 0.083 0.081 0.385** 0.191    
 (0.077) (0.071) (0.140) (0.145) (0.130) (0.133) (0.147) (0.160)    
Public debt (% GDP) -0.017 -0.009 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.013    
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)    
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Table C1 continued         
Independent aid agency 0.801 0.618       
 (0.796) (0.799)       
Political globalization 0.190** 0.156** 0.090 0.067 0.075* 0.075* 0.076 0.076*   
 (0.073) (0.067) (0.055) (0.055) (0.040) (0.042) (0.051) (0.045)    
Trade openness (% GDP) -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.003    
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)    
Ex-colonial population (ln) -0.133*** -0.102** 0.158** 0.098 0.095* 0.095 0.083 0.099    
 (0.046) (0.039) (0.068) (0.063) (0.049) (0.113) (0.073) (0.125)    
Aid underreporting -13.928*** -13.948*** -13.510*** -13.545*** -11.063*** -10.774*** -13.527*** -10.933*** 
 (1.633) (1.420) (1.495) (1.419) (1.287) (0.876) (1.381) (0.991)    
Lagged dependent variable     0.263** 0.308***  0.299*** 
     (0.096) (0.036)  (0.036)    
GDP growth (%)       0.189* 0.128    
       (0.094) (0.107)    
Public deficit (% GDP)       -0.089 -0.068    
       (0.122) (0.074)    
Unemployment (%)       -0.124 -0.026    
       (0.118) (0.102)    
Right-wing government       -0.090 -0.021    
       (0.466) (0.463)    
FDI outflows (% GDP)       0.000 0.000    
       (0.000) (0.000)    
Peer effort (ln)       -1.945 -0.841    
       (3.032) (3.077)    
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor-FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 521 521 521 521 521 521 498 498 
Number of donor countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of imputations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) earmarked aid and covers the years 1990-2012. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the donor country 
level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Appendix D 
Table D1: List of multilateral organizations (component 1 of the data) 
 
Adaptation Fund 
Africa Partnership Forum 
Africa Program for Onchocerciasis Control 
Africa Rice Center 
African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education 
African Capacity Building Foundation 
African Center for Technology Studies 
African Development Bank 
African Development Fund 
African Export Import Bank 
African Training and Management Services Organization 
African Union (excluding peacekeeping facilities) 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
Andean Community 
Andean Development Corporation 
Asia Europe Foundation 
Asian Development Bank 
Asian Development Fund 
Asian Productivity Organisation 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission 
Association for the Development of Education in Africa 
Association of South East Asian Nations: Economic Co-operation 
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Trust Fund 
Basle Convention 
Bioversity International 
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank 
Bonn Convention 
Caribbean Community Secretariat 
Caribbean Development Bank 
Caribbean Epidemiology Centre 
Center for International Forestry Research 
Central African States Development Bank 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
Central Emergency Response Fund 
Central European Free Trade Area Secretariat 
Central European Initiative - Special Fund for Climate and Environmental Protection 
Centre Agriculture & Bioscience International 
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CGIAR Fund 
Cities Alliance 
Cities Development Initiative for Asia 
Clean Technology Fund 
Climate and clean air coalition to reduce short-lived climate pollutants 
Climate Investment Funds 
ClimDev Africa Special Fund 
Colombo Plan 
Commission on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation 
Common Fund for Commodities 
Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
Commonwealth universe 
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
Convention on Cluster Munition 
Convention on Conventional Weapons 
Convention on international trade in endangered species 
Convention to Combat Desertification 
Council of Europe 
Council of Europe Development Bank 
Debt Relief Trust Fund 
Desert Locust Control Organisation for Eastern Africa 
East African Community 
East African Development Bank 
East African Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism 
Eastern and Southern Africa Initiative on Debt Reserves Management 
Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Corporation 
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank 
Eastern-Regional Organisation of Public Administration 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
Economic Commission for Africa 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Economic Community of Central African States 
Economic Community of West African States 
Enhanced Integrated Framework 
Environment and Development Action in the Third World 
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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European Commission - Development Share of Budget 
European Commission - European Development Fund 
European Forest Institute 
European Investment Bank 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative International Secretariat 
Fondo Indigenia 
Food and Agricultural Organisation 
Food and Fertilizer Technology Centre 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
Forum Fisheries Agency 
Framework Convention to protect the maritime environment of the Caspian Sea 
Francophone organizations 
Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program 
Global Alliance for ICT and Development 
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
Global Biodiversity Information Facility 
Global Climate Partnership Fund 
Global Crop Diversity Trust 
Global Development Network 
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund 
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 
Global e-Schools and Communities Initiative 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
Global Green Growth Institute 
Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration Development 
Global Partnership on Education 
Global Water Partnership 
Guyana REDD Investment Fund 
Haiti Reconstruction Fund 
Iberoamerican Organization of States  
ICPO-Interpol 
Infrastructure Consortium Africa 
Inter-American Development Bank, Inter-American Investment Corporation and Multilateral Investment Fund 
Inter-American Indian Institute 
Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
Intergovernmental Coordination Group on the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 
56 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
International Center for Integrated Mountain Management 
International Whaling Commission 
International Advisory and Monitoring Board 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
International Board for Soil Research Management 
International Center for Migration Policy Development 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies 
International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas 
International Centre for Development Oriented Research in Agriculture 
International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh 
International Centre for Tropical Agriculture 
International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
International Cocoa Organization 
International Coffee Organization 
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
International Commission against the Death Penalty 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
International Cotton Advisory Committee 
International Crop Research for Semi-Arid Tropics 
International Development Association 
International Development Law Organisation 
International drug purchase facility 
International Energy Agency 
International Finance Corporation 
International Finance Facility for Immunisation 
International Food Policy Research Centre 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
International Health Partnership 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
International Institute for Cotton 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
International Labour Organisation 
International Land Coalition 
International Livestock Research Institute 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre 
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International Maritime Organization - Technical Co-operation Fund 
International Monetary Fund 
International Network for Bamboo and Rattan 
International Olympic Committee 
International Organisation for Migration 
International Organisation of the Francophonie 
International Partnership on Microbicides 
International Potato Centre 
International Renewable Energy Agency 
International Rice Research Institute 
International Seed Testing Association 
International Service for National Agricultural Research 
International Standards Organizations 
International Tax Dialogue 
International Telecommunications Union 
International Tropical Timber Organisation 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
International Vaccine Institute 
International Water Management Institute 
INTERPOL Fund for Aid and Technical Assistance to Developing Countries 
Investment Climate Facility 
Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
Joint Vienna Institute 
Justice Studies Centre of the Americas 
Latin American Archives 
Latin Union Organization 
Latin-American Energy Organisation 
Macroeconomic Financial Management Institute for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Mekong River Commission 
MENA Transition Fund 
Mercado del Sur 
Microfinance Enhancement Facility 
Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit 
Mountain Partnership Secretariat 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund Aceh 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund 
Network of Networks for Impact Evaluation 
New Partnership for Africa's Development 
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Nordic Development Fund 
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Office of the High Representative 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Organisation of American States 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
Pan-American Health Organisation 
Pan-American Institute of Geography and History 
Pan-American Railway Congress Association 
Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century 
Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Private Infrastructure Development Group 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
Regional Cooperation Council 
Regional Environmental Center 
Regional Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Investment Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Regional Organisation for the Strengthening of Supreme Audit Institutions of Francophone Sub-Saharan 
Countries 
Rotterdam Convention 
Sahara and Sahel Observatory 
Sahel and West Africa Club 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
Small Arms Survey 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
South East Asian Fisheries Development Centre 
South East Asian Ministers of Education 
South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission 
South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment 
Southern African Development Community 
Southern African Transport and Communications Commission 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
Stockholm Convention 
Strategic Climate Fund 
Temporary International Presence Hebron 
Three MDG Fund Myanmar 
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Transition and Demobilization Reintegration Program 
Tropical Agricultural Research Higher Education Center 
Tropical Diseases Research Program 
United Nations (unspecified) 
United Nations Children’s Fund 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
United Nations Democracy Fund 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 
United Nations Environment Programme 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
United Nations Human Settlement Programme 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
United Nations Mine Action Service 
United Nations Office for Project Services 
United Nations Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 
United Nations Population Fund 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
United Nations Special Initiative on Africa 
United Nations System Staff College 
United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition 
United Nations University (including Endowment Fund) 
United Nations Volunteers 
United Nations World Tourism Organisation 
Universal Postal Union 
Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services 
West African Development Bank 
West African Monetary Union 
Western Balkans Investment Framework 
World AgroForestry Centre 
World Commission on Dams 
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World Customs Organisation 
World Food Programme 
World Health Organisation 
World Intellectual Property Organisation 
World Maritime University 
World Meteorological Organisation 
World Organisation for Animal Health 
World Trade Organisation 
World Trade Organisation - International Trade Centre 
World Vegetable Centre 
World Fish Centre 
 
